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Articles 
THE NAME IS THE SAME, BUT THE FACTS 
HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO PROTECT THE 
ATTORNEYS:  STRICKLAND, JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION, AND APPELLATE DECISION-
MAKING 
Gregory J. O’Meara, S.J.* 
“In my end is my beginning.”  T.S. Eliot1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has changed the law on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and few commentators seem to have noticed.2  In Wiggins v. 
Smith3 and Rompilla v. Beard,4 the Court found representation provided 
by criminal defense counsel to have been ineffective.  Yet, counsel in 
both Wiggins and Rompilla did far more than trial counsel in Strickland v. 
Washington, where the Court found counsel’s representation to be 
effective under the Constitution.5  The Court’s shift in the standard for 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A. University of 
Notre Dame; J.D. University of Wisconsin; LL.M. New York University.  The author 
expresses his appreciation to Professors Daniel Blinka, Edward Gaffney, J. Patrick Green, 
Scott Moss, David Papke, and Shirley Wiegand for their helpful comments.  The author is 
also grateful for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Loyola 
Los Angeles Faculty Forum.  Thanks also to Danielle Bergner for her careful comments.  
Any errors remaining are, of course, my own. 
1 T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 129 (1952). 
2 Most criminal procedure textbooks either ignore cases after Strickland v. Washington or 
treat them as mere glosses on minor points that do not affect the substance of the Strickland 
ruling.  Compare MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed., West 2006) (providing an example of authors who 
ignore later cases), and PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FROM INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL (4th ed., West 2005) (same), with  MARC MILLER 
& RONALD WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:  PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION, CASES 
STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 53 (2d ed., Aspen 2005) (providing an example of 
authors who treat the later cases as glosses), and JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, 
2005 SUPPLEMENT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 87-91 
(2d ed. 2006) (same).  See also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL, 2005 SUPPLEMENT TO CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE:  CASES PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 29 (2005) (raising the possibility that the law 
has changed by asking, in a note following the edited version of Rompilla:  “Did the 
majority revise the Strickland analysis sub silentio . . . ?”). 
3 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
4 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984). 
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ineffectiveness has remained under the radar because federal statutes 
designed to limit habeas appeals prevent courts from announcing new 
legal rules in criminal cases that arise in habeas proceedings.  Therefore, 
the Court has changed the law in a subtle way.  This Article explores the 
mechanism through which the Court has changed the law in addition to 
mapping out what that change is.  Specifically, although the Court 
continues to claim adherence to the Strickland holding, its later cases 
focus on sorts of facts explicitly ignored in the Strickland case, even 
though these facts were the bases for the state and federal court decisions 
in that case.  By changing which facts “count” in ineffective assistance 
cases, the Court has quietly changed the law. 
Discounting or changing facts is not a practice limited to Supreme 
Court Justices.  Lawyers, judges, and legal academics operate under a 
widely-shared fiction that legal facts are found and fixed solely by jury 
determinations or by a judge in a jury’s absence.  Thus, legal analysis 
draws our attention almost uniformly to the differences among rules or 
norms generated by a given case.  The Strickland line of cases 
demonstrates that the failure to attend to the density and shading of facts 
recounted by appellate courts obfuscates how the law develops and 
changes.  By ignoring, subordinating, or over-emphasizing facts found 
by lower courts, appellate courts change the legal landscape for a given 
rule; they change the law.  In Part II, this Article introduces the idea of 
relevant legal categories:  combinations of facts and law that together 
constitute the holding of a case.  Despite widespread agreement on this 
point, legal commentators rarely consider how courts change facts in 
arriving at the holding of appellate decisions.6  Part III of this Article 
explores judicial discretion and Congress’ attempt to limit that discretion 
in habeas proceedings.7  Part IV of this Article considers the work of Paul 
Ricoeur, the leading narrative theorist of the past century.  Ricoeur 
maintained that all non-fiction narratives are constructed entities, and 
findings of fact in appellate decisions are nothing more than non-fiction 
narratives.8  Therefore, Ricoeur’s observations subvert the received 
wisdom that appellate courts adopt the findings of lower courts without 
alteration.  This Part describes in some detail how authors change 
supposedly “fixed” histories of past events.9  Finally, in Part V, this 
Article returns to Strickland and its progeny to demonstrate just how the 
Court has exercised judicial discretion and changed the law following 
                                                          
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
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Strickland by changing the level of density whereby it recounts the facts 
in later cases.10  The Article concludes that, for the Supreme Court, facts 
found by lower courts are not an end, but a beginning.11 
II.  LEGAL CATEGORIES EMERGE OUT OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS 
A. Legal Categories:  Facts Combined with Legal Norms or Rules 
The way lawyers think goes back to Sesame Street; ultimately, 
attorneys put people, places, and situations into categories.12  Life, for the 
lawyer, is a game of “[o]ne of these things is not like the others.”13  As a 
childhood game, such a practice is relatively harmless.  Children begin 
with simple classifications such as even versus odd numbers, fruits 
versus vegetables, animals versus plants.  Legal categories are less 
clearly defined, and their consequences may be less benign. Who is a 
member of a class able to sue?  Where do the geographical boundaries of 
the United States end, permitting the government to ignore 
constitutional guarantees?  When does the statute of limitations expire?  
The answers to these questions determine a person’s ability to claim 
redress in courts and determine when and if the government may be 
held accountable for its actions.  Categories do not simply separate 
zebras from palm trees; they also decide the fate of human beings. 
Relevant legal categories are determined by the interplay among 
constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, and case precedent on the 
one hand, and the facts that ground a particular dispute on the other.14  
                                                          
10 See infra Part V. 
11 See infra Part VI. 
12 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).  “Categories 
are ubiquitous and inescapable in the use of mind.  Nobody can do without them–not 
lawyers or judges . . . .Categories are the badges of our sociopolitical allegiances, the tools 
of our mental life, the organizers of our perception.”  Id. at 19. 
13 Id. at 54-55. 
14 See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 17 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989). 
The distinction among the three objects of judicial discretion is blurred.  
The difficulty is inherent in the fact that we do not have accurate 
instruments for determining what constitutes a fact and what a norm, 
and where the border between them lies.  Moreover, the judge cannot 
decide the facts before he formulates for himself, if only at first glance, 
a view of the law, since the number of facts is infinite and he must 
focus only on those that are relevant, which is determined by the law.  
Yet the judge cannot determine the law before he takes, again if only as 
a first impression, a stand regarding the facts, since the number of laws 
is great and he must concentrate on the law that applies, which is 
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The interaction of these sources is subtle and nuanced, the precise 
working of which is dimly understood at best.15  The French philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur describes how difficult the application of legal rules to facts 
can be: 
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex 
operation where the interpretation of the facts and the 
interpretation of the norm mutually condition each 
other, before ending in the qualification by which it is 
said that some allegedly criminal behavior falls under 
such and such a norm which is said to have been 
violated.  If we begin with the interpretation of the facts, 
we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of 
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say, 
recounted . . . We never finish untangling the lines of the 
personal story of an accused with certainty, and even 
reading it in such a way is already oriented by the 
presumption that such an interconnectedness places the 
case under some rule.  To say that a is a case of B is 
already to decide that the juridical syllogism holds for 
it.16 
Indeed, it can be perplexing to determine if disagreement in 
appellate decisions arises from a conflict over the meaning of law or 
confusion about underlying facts in the case.17  By announcing the 
                                                                                                                                  
determined by the nature of the facts.  There exists, then, an intimate 
link between norm and fact. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
15 PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans., 2000). 
16 Id.  Ricoeur held appointments at the University of Strasbourg and the University of 
Paris.  Most recently, he was the John Nuveen Professor Emeritus at the Divinity School, 
the Department of Philosophy, and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of 
Chicago until his death in 2005.  He is widely considered one of the seminal thinkers of the 
twentieth century. 
17 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 80-81 (1921) (stating 
“Courts have often been led into error in passing upon the validity of a statute, not from 
misunderstanding of the law, but from misunderstanding of the facts.”); accord, RICOEUR, 
supra note 15, at 123 (stating that  “The ‘facts’ in a case, not just their evaluation but their 
very description, are the object of multiple legal disputes where, once again, the 
interpretation of the norm and that of these facts overlap.”).  See also JEROME N. FRANK, IF 
MEN WERE ANGELS, SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY 78 (1942).  Frank 
states: 
Even the most conscientious judges, trained in fact finding, often do 
not agree with one another about the facts of a case.  “In my experience 
in the conference room of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which consists of nine judges,” said Mr. Justice Miller, “I have been 
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applicable legal categories in its decision, the court designates acts which 
are relevant and those which are not in a given situation.18  Moving to 
the precedential power of a decided case, perhaps lawyers too easily 
claim that all like cases are treated similarly under law.  Facts are 
slippery things, and changing circumstances can undermine and unseat 
the most elegantly-reasoned precedent.19 
Although commentators uniformly proclaim that legal categories 
emerge out of the interplay of facts and norms, academics usually 
confine their analysis to the development of norms alone.  For example, 
Duncan Kennedy’s brilliant synthesis, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de 
siècle),20 focuses solely on the development of legal rules; the word 
“facts” does not appear in the index to his book.  Similarly, Jurgen 
Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms uses the word “facts” in an 
idiosyncratic way.  His translator, William Rehg, observes that 
Habermas understands the word “facts” as “facticity,”21 the “factual 
generation, administration, and enforcement in social institutions” that 
lie beneath law, such as the processes whereby governments negotiate 
internal differences among various governmental actors.22  Habermas’ 
focus on the structural limitations of political process differs markedly 
from the recounting of historical events in trial courts and appellate 
decisions. 
                                                                                                                                  
surprised to find how readily those judges came to an agreement upon 
questions of law, and how often they disagree in regard to questions of 
facts.” 
Id. 
18 See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 217-18 (William Rehg trans., 1996).  He states: 
Because each norm selects only specific features of an individual 
case . . . , the . . . [rules for determining how the law is to be followed] 
must determine which descriptions of the facts are significant and 
exhaustive for interpreting the situation in a disputed case; it must also 
determine which of the prima facie valid norms is the appropriate one 
once all the significant features of the situation have been apprehended 
as fully as possible. 
Id. 
19 See H.L.A. Hart, Problems in the Philosophy of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 88, 106 (1983). Hart states, “Rules cannot claim their own instances, and fact 
situations do not await the judge neatly labelled with the rule applicable to them.  Rules 
cannot provide for their own application, and even in the clearest case a human being must 
apply them.”  Id. 
20 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997). 
21 HABERMAS, supra note 18, at xi. 
22 Id. at xii. 
O'Meara: The Name is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed To Protect
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
692 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
Legal theorists prefer to explore the generation and development of 
norms, which are understood as manipulated and developed as a matter 
of course, because facts are seen largely as inert substances, necessary 
ingredients that add little to the dynamic process wherein legal 
categories are forged.  This view of facts could stem from two sorts of 
approaches.  In the first approach, facts are considered as background or 
stage sets.  They do not enter into legal reasoning themselves but lie 
behind it.  Here, facts take on the role of the supporting cast in a play.  
They offer human interest, but they are mere stage props; they may 
assist the actor, but they are never of central importance.  In the second 
sort of approach, brute facts dictate what the law must become.  Because 
they are not subject to change or whim, the law is built around the facts 
found in a case; facts cannot be analyzed because they consist of matters 
beyond the courts’ control.  A close study of narrative theory 
undermines seeing facts in a case as either bit players or insurmountable 
forces of nature. 
B. Destabilizing Legal Categories:  Frank, Pound, & Goodhart; Historical 
Events Differ from Legal Facts 
Jerome Frank initially seemed to favor the second approach outlined 
previously, because he maintained that facts alone were decisive in 
forging legal opinions.  Frank largely ignored legal rules or norms 
because he thought they had no real claim on ensuing legal decisions.23  
Although he conceded that court decisions or even statutes might 
contain words labeled as “legal rules,” such rules were merely 
summaries of judicial decisions determined by facts.  As such, they aid in 
predicting future judicial determinations, but this assistance is merely a 
prediction of likely outcomes rather than a weight to be factored into 
                                                          
23 ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 152 (1990).  Jerome 
Frank took over the Securities and Exchange Commission when Justice William O. Douglas 
went to the Supreme Court.  Id.  Frank wrote about law and jurisprudence, though he 
never held a formal academic appointment.  Id.  His position with regard to legal rules is 
usually characterized as rule skepticism.  Id.  There are two varieties of this outlook.  Id.  
Professor Karl Llewellyn of Columbia Law School exemplified the moderate view.  Id.  
Andrew Altman characterizes Llewellyn’s moderate brand of rule skepticism as follows:  
“[L]egal officials often do not behave in the way called for by the rules inscribed in the 
authoritative legal texts.”  Id.  Law, in Llewellyn’s view, is a more open proposition than 
positivists would like us to believe.  Id.  Although it is sometimes governed by reference to 
precedent, law also has recourse to matters beyond the text of the law.  Id.  “Rules guide, 
although they do not control, decision.”  Id.  By contrast, Frank’s approach was more 
radical.  Id. at 153.  Indeed, Frank challenged the very existence of legal rules insofar as they 
affect the behavior of judges or others who were presumably bound by them.  Id.  Frank 
stated that, “[legal rules] were ‘merely words’ that aided in the prediction of decisions but 
were incapable of exercising any constraint over them.”  Id. 
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legal calculation.24  Because he denied operative effect to constitutions, 
statutes, and precedent in determining legal categories, Frank asserted 
that what courts really do is determine historical facts.25  To explain his 
position, he described a hypothetical encounter between a client and her 
attorney.26  Ordinary people, perhaps relying upon a model suggested 
by medical consultations, assume that an authoritative legal opinion can 
be rendered by any attorney who hears the facts of a possible suit 
recounted in her office.27  Frank observed that the attorney must be 
guarded in assessing the merits of a case, not because the attorney has an 
inadequate apprehension of the law, but because she cannot determine 
which facts the court will find at trial.28 
Frank departs from reliance on “brute facts” as previously described 
because he thought that the human sources of the “facts” in a lawsuit 
were so beset by psychological distortions that the information they 
imparted could not be uncritically trusted: 
The actual facts which provoke the litigation do not 
themselves walk into court.  They do not happen in the 
courtroom.  When the lawsuit is tried, those facts are 
past events.  They occurred months or years earlier.  
What comes into court is evidence concerning those past 
happenings.  And what is “evidence”?  It consists of the 
testimony of witnesses–what the witnesses say about 
those past actual occurrences.29  
For Frank, legal fact-finding is necessarily flawed because any transfer of 
information faces psychological barriers rooted in human frailty.  For 
this reason, he doubted the assumed correspondence between historical 
events and a witness’s testimony in court, stating: 
Witnesses are not infallible.  They are, often, poor 
observers of the events, forgetful or biased recollectors.  
They may make mistakes in (1) the way they originally 
heard or saw what happened or (2) the way they remember 
what they heard or saw, or (3) the way they tell, in the 
courtroom, what they remember.  That testimony, at 
                                                          
24 Id. at 153. 
25 FRANK, supra note 17, at 111-12. 
26 Id. at 66-101. 
27 Id. at 67. 
28 Id. at 67-68. 
29 Id. at 68 (italics and footnote omitted). 
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each of these three stages, is affected by the individual 
experiences, temperaments and characters of witnesses 
has often been observed.30 
Frank applied a hermeneutic of suspicion to the presumed link between 
“what really happened” in history—the event—and what the witness 
says occurred.  He noted that mistakes in testimony arise from reasons as 
nefarious as prejudice and perjury31 and as benign as an “unconscious 
partisanship” that emerges from attitudes and psychological motivations 
the witness may not fully understand.32 
Frank likewise destabilized the presumed connection between 
historical events themselves and the facts found in trial court, because 
witnesses’ testimony was itself interpreted by finders of fact who were 
affected by the same human distortions which infected those testifying.  
Specifically, Frank stated: 
[T]he judge or the jury must reach a conclusion as to 
which witnesses are to be believed.  The “facts” of such a 
“contested” case consist of that belief of the judge or 
jury—consist of their guess as to the actual facts.  And 
that guess, we repeat, is fallible—because judges and 
juries are themselves human beings, and are therefore 
fallible witnesses of what the fallible witnesses testify.33 
Additionally, Frank described the finders of fact as “second-order 
witnesses” who have a distinctively more important role to play than 
testifying witnesses, because jurors or the judge determine the version of 
facts which will be authoritative and, thus, have legal importance: 
A court’s decision turns on the “facts” of the case.  But 
the “facts,” when there is a clash of testimony, are in 
truth nothing but a subjective reaction of the judge or 
jury to the testimony, a guess by the judge or jury as to 
what actually occurred months or years before the 
lawsuit began.  For court purposes, the real conduct of 
the parties to the lawsuit does not count.  All that counts 
is the judge’s or jury’s guess as to that conduct.34 
                                                          
30 Id. (italics in original). 
31 Id. at 70. 
32 Id. at 69. 
33 Id. at 71. 
34 Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted). 
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Frank’s prodding compelled other scholars to address the distortions 
inherent in factual determinations, particularly the gap noted between 
historical events and facts found in court.  Notably, both Roscoe Pound, 
Dean of Harvard Law School, and Professor Arthur Goodhart of Oxford 
left unchallenged Frank’s skepticism in this regard.  For example, Pound 
observed that, even if facts elicited in a trial court do not match up with 
historical events, the law that issues from such situations is 
unproblematic, stating: 
At common law, the chief reliance for individualizing 
the application of law is the power of juries to render 
general verdicts, the power to find the facts in such a way 
as to compel a result different from that which the legal rule 
strictly applied would require.  In appearance, there has 
been no individualization.  The judgment follows 
necessarily and mechanically from the facts upon the 
record.  But the facts found were found in order to reach the 
result and are by no means necessarily the facts of the 
particular case.35 
Pound’s skepticism is more pronounced than Frank’s.  Frank saw fact-
finders as hampered in the recovery of historical events because of 
largely unconscious conditions of human psychology, which rendered 
inaccurate both the transmission and reception of information.36  By 
contrast, Pound implies a willful motive to shape facts in the record.  
Pound indicated that the “facts found were found in order to reach the result 
and are by no means necessarily the facts of the particular case.”37  A fair 
reading of Pound implies that the fact-finder decides first what the 
decision should be and then assembles facts (whether consciously or not) 
to compel the result desired.  For Pound, findings of facts are plainly 
constructed and they need not match historical events in the case at 
hand.38  Thus, Pound suggests that legal norms can be based on fictional 
events. 
In contrast, Professor Goodhart’s answer to the destabilizing moves 
noted by Frank and Pound simply ignores the existence of any difficulty.  
Rather than address the correspondence between a given historical event 
and the facts in the record, Goodhart defined the issue out of existence 
by stating: 
                                                          
35 Id. at 85 (italics omitted). 
36 See, e.g., id. at 69-70. 
37 Id. at 85 (italics omitted). 
38 Id. 
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If we are bound by the facts as seen by the judge, may 
not this enable him deliberately or by inadvertence to 
decide a case which was not before him by basing his 
decision upon facts stated by him as real and material 
but actually non-existent? . . . Can a judge, by making a 
mistake give himself authority to decide what is in effect 
a hypothetical case?  The answer to this interesting 
question is that the whole doctrine of precedent is based 
on the theory that as a general rule judges do not make 
mistakes either of fact or of law.  In an exceptional case  
a judge may in error base his conclusion on a non-
existent fact, but it is better to suffer this 
mistake, . . . than to throw doubt on every precedent on 
which our law is based.39 
As his explanation makes clear, Goodhart recognized fully the tensions 
indicated by both Frank and Pound.40  Goodhart’s quotation above 
reveals that he simply removed the issue by fiat, as if to say, “I declare 
that these issues are unimportant because, as a matter of law, courts do 
not make these mistakes, and if they do make them, we must ignore 
them for the greater good.”  Goodhart’s failure to address Frank’s 
objections leaves the possibility that legal norms can be based on 
essentially fictitious constructs. 
C. Destabilizing Legal Categories:  Strickland v. Washington; Different 
Courts Find Different Facts in the Same Case 
Contemporary law has not resolved the gap Frank identified 
between historical facts and the facts as found by a court; to demonstrate 
this thesis, one need only consider how different courts describe the 
same historical facts.  For example, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Strickland v. Washington, when compared with the cases leading up to it 
in the lower courts, illustrates how malleable descriptions of the same 
event can be.41 
To depart from standard practice, it is necessary to ignore the legal 
rule and consider simply the facts in Strickland as recounted by the 
reviewing courts.  The differences between the findings of fact are best 
revealed if one focuses on the two interwoven strands of narrative that 
                                                          
39 Arthur Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 181-82 
(1930). 
40 Id. 
41 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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appear in all the cases.  In narrative one (the crime story), the opinions 
describe both the underlying offense and the biography of the defendant.  
In narrative two (the representation story), the opinions set out the 
actions of the defendant’s attorney. 
The crime story set out by the Supreme Court is a crisp and tightly 
organized paragraph: 
During a 10-day period in September 1976, . . . [David 
Washington] planned and committed three groups of 
crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, 
torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders, 
attempted extortion, and theft.  After his two 
accomplices were arrested, . . . [Washington] 
surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy 
statement confessing to the third of the criminal 
episodes.  The State of Florida indicted . . . [him] for 
kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced 
criminal lawyer to represent him.42 
After this description of the offenses charged (with no reference to 
the defendant’s biography), the Court focused its attention on the 
representation story which described the actions of trial counsel, who 
was named nowhere in the opinion.  Overall, the Court presented 
Washington’s attorney as engaged and energetic, yet obstructed by a 
recalcitrant client.  The narrative began by observing that the lawyer 
“actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery.”43  The Court 
continued: 
[The attorney] cut his efforts short, however, and he 
experienced a sense of hopelessness about the case, 
when he learned that, against his specific advice, . . . 
[Washington] had also confessed to the first two 
murders. . . . [Washington] waived his right to a jury 
trial, again acting against counsel’s advice, and pleaded 
guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder 
charges.44 
Although counsel advised the defendant of his right to have an advisory 
jury on the capital charges, Washington rejected that advice and decided 
                                                          
42 Id. at 671-72. 
43 Id. at 672. 
44 Id. 
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to waive his right to a jury on the matter, leaving sentencing in the hands 
of the judge.45 
Moreover, in preparation for sentencing, counsel spoke with the 
defendant about his background.46  Although he never met 
Washington’s wife or mother, counsel did have one phone conference 
with them.47  He did not seek other character witnesses to bolster David 
Washington’s case, nor did he request a psychiatric examination “since 
his conversations with his client gave no indication that . . . [Washington] 
had psychological problems.”48  Because of counsel’s own sense of 
hopelessness about overcoming the confession to these crimes, counsel 
decided not to put on further evidence about Washington’s character 
and emotional state.49  Counsel thought it best to rely on the plea 
colloquy to draw these matters out rather than on an evidentiary hearing 
which would subject Washington to cross-examination; this strategy 
likewise prevented the State from putting on psychiatric evidence of its 
own.50  Counsel excluded the defendant’s rap sheet and chose not to 
request a presentence investigation because such a document would 
have shown the defendant’s prior criminal history.51 
At sentencing, counsel advised the defendant to own up to his 
wrong-doing and take responsibility for his own actions because the 
judge liked that approach.52  Counsel argued to the trial court that the 
defendant had no history of criminal activity and that his client 
committed these offenses under the influence of a statutory mitigating 
factor:  “extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”53  Counsel said that 
the defendant should be spared the death penalty because he had 
confessed, offered to testify against a co-defendant, and because he was 
fundamentally a good person who had “briefly gone badly wrong in 
extremely stressful circumstances.”54  After the prosecution put on 
witnesses who described “details of the crimes,”55 the trial court found 
that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors and sentenced 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 672-73. 
48 Id. at 673. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 673-74. 
54 Id. at 674. 
55 Id. 
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David Washington to death on each of the three counts of murder and to 
prison terms for the other crimes.56 
The majority decision considered two additional factors bearing on 
the attorney’s competence:  his failure to investigate the defendant’s 
mental condition and his failure to call character witnesses.  The 
defendant’s mental state emerged as an issue immediately after the 
defendant appeared in the trial court.57  Washington was subject to a 
mental examination soon after his arraignment by order of the trial 
court.58  The Supreme Court opinion does not explicitly identify this 
examination as ordered to determine competency, but lower court 
decisions indicate this was the case.59  Justice O’Connor found the 
defendant’s evidence of mental disturbance unpersuasive, stating: 
[A] psychiatric examination of . . . [the defendant] was 
conducted by state order soon after . . . [Washington’s] 
initial arraignment.  That report states that there was no 
indication of major mental illness at the time of the 
crimes.  Moreover, both the reports submitted in the 
collateral proceeding state that, although respondent 
was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his 
economic dilemma,” he was not under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  All three 
                                                          
56 Id. at 675. 
57 Id. at 675-76. 
58 Id. at 676. 
59 See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888 (5th Cir. 1982).  The Fifth Circuit panel 
quotes Doctor Sanford Jacobsen’s report that tracks the standard for competency review:  
“It is my opinion that presently the defendant is able to assist counsel in his defense and 
understand the nature of the charges against him.  It is felt that the defendant possesses 
both a rational and factual understanding of the charges.”  Id.  Jacobsen’s report also 
considers the ALI standards for the statutory defense of not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect:  “It is further felt that the defendant at the time of the alleged offense had 
the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.”  Id.  It is not clear from the record if this second 
determination was ordered by the trial court or if Dr. Jacobsen acted sua sponte in giving 
his opinion on the matter.  See also MODEL PENAL CODE  § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962), providing: 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
(2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not 
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise anti-social conduct. 
Id. 
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reports thus directly undermine the contention made at 
the sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering 
from extreme mental or emotional disturbance during 
his crime spree.60 
The Court relied on this fact to counter criticism that the defense 
attorney failed to hire his own psychiatric or psychological expert.61  
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor observed, “the aggravating 
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice 
resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence 
offered in the collateral attack.”62    
Second, fourteen persons later submitted affidavits attesting to the 
defendant’s good character, his financial worries, and that the acts 
charged were not representative of the sort of person he was, which 
could be used as part of a mitigation argument.63  Justice O’Connor also 
rejected this evidence as either cumulative or flawed.64  The defendant 
testified “along those lines at the plea colloquy.”65  Justice O’Connor 
continued, “[m]oreover, respondent’s admission [during the plea 
colloquy] of a course of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations 
[claiming the defendant had no prior record] in the affidavits.”66 
In light of these facts recounted by the Court, the explanation for 
David Washington’s death sentence seems clear.  The crime story 
narrative strand portrays an ordinary and hopeless case which Clarence 
Darrow could not have rescued.  The representation narrative strand 
depicts a hard-working defense attorney facing overwhelming odds and 
an uncooperative defendant.  Although the experienced attorney made 
strong efforts, he could not undo the missteps David Washington had 
made.  The defendant is portrayed as a generic client with no remarkable 
biography who had a felony record and could not be expected to act 
differently.  In large measure, the death warrant was signed and sealed 
before David Washington entered the courtroom. 
Justice O’Connor observes that “[t]here are no conflicts between the 
state and federal courts over findings of fact[;]”67 however, the more 
                                                          
60 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676-77. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 677. 
63 Id. at 675, 677. 
64 Id. at 677. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 698. 
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detailed facts recounted in the crime story by the lower courts contrast 
vividly with the brief and monochromatic recitation of the Strickland 
majority.  Initially, the murders at issue are extraordinarily bloody and 
sexually coded, described by the government as “three (3) of the most 
brutal murders in Florida’s history.”68  The description offered by the 
Supreme Court of Florida bears out that characterization: 
These appeals arise out of a series of murders committed 
by appellant during a twelve-day period.  On September 
20, 1976, appellant and an accomplice formulated a plan 
to rob and kill Daniel Pridgen.  The purported motive 
for the killing was the fact that Pridgen, a minister, was a 
homosexual and in appellant’s opinion a man of the 
cloth violated religious and moral precepts by engaging 
in homosexual activities.  According to the plan, 
appellant’s accomplice was to induce Pridgen to engage 
in homosexual activities.  When Pridgen was undressed 
and in bed, the accomplice was to cough two times as a 
sign for appellant to enter the home and kill 
Pridgen. . . . [W]hile the accomplice covered Pridgen’s 
face with a pillow and held him helpless, appellant 
stabbed the victim to death.69 
During the evening of September 23, 1976, appellant 
proceeded to the residence of Katrina Birk pursuant to a 
plan for robbery. Mr. Birk allegedly had previously 
acted as a “fence” for property stolen by 
appellant. . . . Appellant waited until he was relatively 
certain that the occupants of the home, Mrs. Birk and her 
three sisters-in-law, were together in one 
room. . . . Appellant instructed the four occupants to lie 
on the floor.  Two of the women complied with 
appellant’s demand, and appellant permitted one 
woman to seat herself in a chair.  Mrs. Birk went into the 
kitchen and obtained a box containing money, which she 
offered to appellant.  [Appellant then tied up the four 
women.] . . . As appellant was completing this task, he 
observed Mrs. Birk inching her way into the kitchen.  An 
argument ensued between the two, and appellant shot 
                                                          
68 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554), in 
146 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 218 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1985). 
69  Washington v. Florida, 362 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1978). 
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Mrs. Birk in the head and repeatedly stabbed her with 
his knife, causing her death.  Appellant thereafter 
approached his bound victims, shooting each in the 
head and inflicting several stab wounds. . . . Each of the 
sisters-in-law survived the assault.  However, one 
woman became blind in one eye, one suffers breathing 
difficulties due to the knife wounds to her lungs, and 
one remains in a comatose, vegetable state.70 
On approximately September 27, 1976, appellant 
contacted his third victim, Frank Meli, [to arrange a test-
drive and purchase of a car Meli had advertised in the 
local paper.] . . . Following the test drive, appellant 
persuaded Meli to go to appellant’s home to obtain the 
money to conclude the sale.  Upon Meli’s entry into 
appellant’s home, appellant brandished a knife and 
forcibly bound his victim to a bed.  Two of appellant’s 
companions assisted appellant in guarding Meli to 
prevent an escape.  Appellant succeeded in selling 
Meli’s automobile and then forced Meli to telephone his 
family and request a ransom. 
On the morning of September 29, 1976, appellant paid 
his companions part of the proceeds from the sale of the 
automobile for their assistance in holding Meli captive.  
Appellant’s friends left the residence and appellant 
entered the bedroom where Meli had been tied spread-
eagled to a bed.  The testimony at this point is 
conflicting.  Appellant stated in his subsequent written 
confession to police that Meli had untied one of the four 
straps securing him to a bed and a struggle ensued.  It is 
uncontested, however, that appellant stabbed Meli 
eleven times.  During the stabbing, appellant’s 
companion entered the bedroom and covered Meli’s face 
with a pillow to prevent others from hearing the victim’s 
screams.  When appellant and his companion left the 
room a few minutes later, Meli was fatally wounded but 
still alive.  Before leaving, appellant secured Meli’s 
bonds and gagged him.  [After unsuccessfully 
attempting to secure the ransom payment, Washington 
                                                          
70  Id. at 660-61; see also Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that the comatose victim later died). 
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returned home and found Meli dead.] . . . Appellant then 
dug a shallow grave in his backyard and buried his 
victim’s body.71 
The gruesomeness of these offenses, which occurred in a ten-day period 
by someone having no history of violent behavior, subverts the flat 
assertion that the defendant had no serious psychiatric or psychological 
disturbance at the time of the crimes. 
There is an initial similarity between Justice O’Connor’s observations 
of the early stages of defense counsel’s representation and the findings in 
the lower courts.  Lower courts describe attorney William Tunkey as 
“eminently qualified and experienced,” although there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that he had ever handled a murder case.72  Courts note 
Tunkey’s original “lengthy interviews” with his client and his beginning 
pre-trial discovery and preparation of pre-trial motions.73  After learning 
that Washington had confessed not only to the Meli case but also to two 
prior murders, Tunkey testified he was “shocked” and “overcome with a 
‘hopeless’ feeling”74 and did “very little” in the weeks preceding the 
sentencing hearing.75  He made no attempt to meet Washington’s mother 
and wife after they had failed to keep one appointment.76 
Where lower courts differ markedly from the Supreme Court is in 
their evaluation of Tunkey’s failure to investigate.  Tunkey claimed 
“minimal” attempts to contact other prospective witnesses to testify on 
Washington’s behalf; nothing in the record indicates that he contacted 
anyone in this regard.77  The district court found “that this failure to 
investigate constituted an ‘error in judgment.’”78  There is conflicting 
                                                          
71 Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661. 
72 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1284 n.16 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Judge Johnson stated that: 
In the case of Mr. Tunkey, the record makes clear that, as a criminal 
attorney, he is eminently qualified and experienced.  In this particular 
case, however, the district court notes that he was simply 
overwhelmed by the unique circumstances of his client’s decision to 
plead guilty. . . . The issue before this Court is not the competence of 
Mr Tunkey; it is only whether on this particular occasion counsel was 
effective. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
73 Strickland, 673 F.2d at 886. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1281 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Although the majority opinion found that such error did not constitute 
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evidence in the record describing Tunkey’s failure to request a 
psychiatric evaluation for a man whose actions Tunkey described as 
“inexplicable” given his impression of Washington as a “person who 
expressed very capably human emotions, who express[ed] grave 
concerns about the welfare of his family, of his wife, of his child.”79  
Originally, Tunkey testified that he did not think psychiatric testimony 
would be helpful in explaining Washington’s behavior.80  Later, Tunkey 
stated under oath:  “I did not think at the time to go ahead and utilize 
psychiatric or psychological experts to somehow demonstrate the 
overriding nature of the mitigating circumstances, I did not think of 
that.”81  Rather than obtain psychiatric testimony to establish claimed 
statutory mitigating circumstance of “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance,” Tunkey testified that the defendant’s own testimony at the 
guilty plea colloquy adequately covered this issue.82  This explanation is 
undercut by the trial record wherein the court denied Washington’s 
attempt to explain his behavior at the guilty plea.  The court stated it 
would consider that issue only at sentencing.83  Despite the court’s 
explicit invitation to do so, Tunkey introduced no mitigating evidence at 
sentencing.84  Again, the record undermines the later claim that this 
choice was “strategic.”85 
The lower court opinions further subvert every claim that Tunkey 
made “tactical choices[;]” rather, they find repeated instances of 
incompetence.  It is not clear that Tunkey even read the court-ordered 
psychiatric examination of the defendant on file in the case.  During the 
habeas proceeding, Tunkey testified that he could not recall if he had seen 
the report at the time of the sentencing hearing.86  This failure is 
underscored by the wealth of support Tunkey could have found for 
mitigation with comparatively little effort.  Two later affidavits from 
psychiatrists indicate that David Washington came from a “broken and 
violent home, one marked by extensive child abuse and incest.”87  They 
note his “panic, frustration, and depression at his economic 
                                                                                                                                  
ineffective assistance of counsel, Judges Johnson and Anderson declined to agree with this 
conclusion.  See id. at 1281 n.4. 
79 Strickland, 673 F.2d at 886. 
80 Id. at 887. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1266 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1284 n.17. 
86 Strickland, 673 F.2d at 888-89. 
87 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1266. 
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circumstances; and his remorse for his crimes.”88  A later psychiatric 
report finds that Washington did meet the statutory defense of being 
“under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or that 
he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” at the 
time of these offenses.89  This report further revealed that Washington 
reported a previous homosexual incident with Pridgen, the first murder 
victim.90 
According to the lower courts, Tunkey’s failure to exert himself on 
his client’s behalf continued through the sentencing hearing.91  At the 
hearing, Tunkey waived his opening statement, relying instead on his 
sentencing memorandum.92  The state produced “nine witnesses who 
testified about the aggravated nature of the offenses.”93  It also 
introduced fifteen exhibits detailing the gruesome crimes.94  Tunkey 
offered no testimony or evidence at the sentencing hearing; rather, he 
relied solely on the statement of the defendant during the guilty plea 
colloquy which the trial court cut short.  Tunkey’s argument at the close 
of the hearing “covers only three transcript pages.”95  Tunkey later 
testified he made the tactical choice to avoid placing David Washington 
on the stand to avoid cross examination during sentencing for fear his 
record would be revealed.96  This “tactical choice” is undermined by the 
record which shows that Washington admitted his prior offenses in the 
guilty plea colloquy weeks before, as Justice O’Connor noted in her 
opinion.97  Tunkey’s claim that there was a “benefit” to keeping his client 
off the stand was illusory.  The district court’s order further noted that 
Tunkey “couldn’t say that [his failure to request a presentence 
                                                          
88 Id. 
89 Strickland, 673 F.2d at 890. 
90 Id. at 891.  The court discounted this later report because it was based on statements 
“only recently made by Washington” and claimed that “a similar evaluation conducted in 
1976 would not have revealed this information.”  Id.  The basis for this conclusion is 
unclear.  Id. 
91 See Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265. 
92 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
93 Id. at 1265. 
94 Id. 
95 Brief for Respondent at 9, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554), 
in 146 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
436 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1985). 
96 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
97 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 677 (1984).  The Court stated that, 
“[m]oreover, respondent’s admission [during the guilty plea colloquy] of a course of 
stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits [describing him as law-
abiding and as having a good character].”  Id. 
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investigation] was a trial strategy.”98  Thus, the district court found 
Tunkey’s testimony that a presentence investigation could be more 
“detrimental than helpful,” to be unsupported by the record.99 
Tunkey’s failures in representation are highlighted by the lower 
courts’ specific findings of fact regarding both the crime itself and the 
defendant’s biography.  In contrast to Justice O’Connor’s minimalist 
draft of the crime narrative, lower-court opinions describe in detail both 
the defendant’s horrendous childhood and his excessively bloody 
offenses.  Washington came from a home marked by violence, abuse, 
and incest.  His murders were extraordinarily grisly and sexual.  All 
involve stabbings or shootings at point blank range that would have 
covered the defendant in copious amounts of blood.  Two stabbings 
occur while the victims are in bed.  In the first, Pridgen is presumably 
unclothed.  In the third killing, the defendant stabs Melli (who is bound 
to the bed and gagged throughout) so that Melli bleeds to death on the 
defendant’s own mattress.  The defendant engages in this behavior in the 
course of ten days with no previous indication of sexually violent 
tendencies.  By covering over these facts, Justice O’Connor’s decision 
obscures evidence of Washington’s psychological disturbance that the 
lower courts thought relevant to their holding that Tunkey’s 
representation was constitutionally defective. 
The lower courts found that Tunkey did almost nothing by way of 
preparation for “three (3) of the most brutal murders in Florida’s 
history.”100  What emerges from these facts is an attorney of meager 
imagination, who lacked rudimentary knowledge of psychology, and 
who did little by way of actually defending a young man who appeared 
mentally or emotionally impaired. 
III.  JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND AEDPA, AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION 
A. Judicial Discretion 
If one case engenders such divergent recountings of the same facts, if 
a gap exists between “historical events” and facts laid out by different 
reviewing courts, then the drafting of facts in these cases, and I submit in 
all cases, must be recognized as a locus for the exercise of judicial 
                                                          
98 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1282 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). 
99 Id. (footnote omitted). 
100 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 68, at 5. 
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discretion.  Judicial discretion occurs whenever a court has the authority 
to choose between at least two permissible alternatives.101  Professor 
Aharon Barak of Hebrew University notes that a judge exercising her 
discretion “will not act mechanically, but will weigh, reflect, gain 
impressions, test, and study.”102  He describes the process of applying 
norms to particular fact situations as more a matter of art than of logical 
deduction; there are necessary gaps in the law wherein a court must act, 
stating: 
[I]t is as though the law were saying, “I have determined 
the contents of the legal norm up to this point.  From 
here on, it is for you, the judge, to determine the 
contents of the legal norm, for I, the legal system, am not 
able to tell you which solution to choose.”  It is as 
though the path of the law came to a junction, and the 
judge must decide–with no clear and precise standard to 
guide him–which road to take.103 
Professor Barak identifies three objects of possible judicial discretion:  
determining the facts, application of a norm previously determined, and 
determining a new norm.104 
In criminal law, the exercise of discretion is seen as a mixed blessing.  
Professor Frank Remington saw discretion as necessary in the criminal 
justice system because the problems addressed are complex and multi-
faceted, and actors in the system need to employ “varied, individualized 
responses” to make the criminal justice system work.105  Remington 
noted further that, although research supports the wise use of discretion 
at different places in the criminal justice system, much decision-making 
in the criminal sphere now rests more on ideological reaction than social 
science.106  Thus, Professor Michael Tonry observes that “official 
                                                          
101 BARAK, supra note 8, at 7. 
102 Id. (footnote omitted). 
103 Id. at 8. 
104 Id. at 12-16. 
105 Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, The Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty, 
and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE:  THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY (Lloyd E. Ohlin & 
Frank J. Remington eds., 1993). 
106 Id.; accord, DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 13 (2001).  He stated: 
In another significant break with past practice, crime policy has ceased 
to be a bipartisan matter that can be devolved to professional experts 
and has become a prominent issue in electoral competition.  A highly 
charged political discourse now surrounds all crime control issues, so 
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discretion is widely distrusted–from the right, from concern for the 
chimera of ‘undue leniency’; from the left, from concern that discretion 
will be exercised invidiously or capriciously.”107  Attacks on discretion 
are found at every level of the criminal justice system.  For instance, 
Professor Lloyd Ohlin observes: 
It should not be assumed that the attack on the 
allocation and use of discretion is confined to sentencing 
decisions alone.  Parole boards are being eliminated or 
their discretion curtailed by legislated mandatory 
sentences or judicial use of split sentence provisions in 
which part of the sentence must be served in 
confinement and part under community supervision.  
Attempts have also been made to limit the freedom of 
prosecutors to engage in charge or plea bargaining.108 
Similarly, Professor Samuel Walker maintains that, almost uniformly, the 
present goal of the criminal justice system seems to be to control 
discretion, or at least challenge it wherever it occurs.109 
Although there is some disagreement on this point, legal theorists 
maintain that discretion shifts its locus of operation, rather than 
disappears, when it is subject to controls.  Professor Remington notes 
that efforts to limit discretion in one area do not eliminate discretion; 
they merely shift it to another process or player in the system.110  For 
example, Remington’s research demonstrates that “efforts to limit 
discretion at other stages, such as sentencing, have greatly increased the 
                                                                                                                                  
that every decision is taken in the glare of publicity and political 
contention and every mistake becomes a scandal. . . . Policy measures 
are constructed in ways that appear to value political advantage and 
public opinion over the views of experts and the evidence of 
research. . . . 
 There is now a distinctly populist current in penal politics that 
denigrates expert and professional elites and claims the authority of 
‘the people’, of common sense, of ‘getting back to basics’.  The 
dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the 
practitioner but that of the long-suffering, ill-served people–especially 
of ‘the victim’ and the fearful, anxious members of the public. 
Id. 
107 Michael Tonry, Foreword, in DISCRETION, supra note 105, at xiv. 
108 Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision Makers, in DISCRETION, 
supra note 103, at 3. 
109 SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM:  THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1950-1990 (1993). 
110 DISCRETION, supra note 105, at 99. 
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power of the prosecutor and the importance of the charging decision.”111  
For Remington, discretion never disappears; it simply moves.  Professor 
Walker disagrees and believes that discretion is not necessarily 
“displaced upstream or downstream.”112  Still, Walker admits that the 
weight of research indicates that the shifting of discretion does occur.113  
B. AEDPA:  An Attempt to Limit Judicial Discretion 
Cases dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel following 
Strickland are often constrained by legislation designed to limit habeas 
proceedings.  If the case arises under anything but a direct appeal from 
the federal district court, it reaches federal review through the 
mechanism of a habeas claim which determines if a prisoner is held in 
violation of the United States Constitution.  The Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) restricts the ability of 
federal courts to announce new law in habeas cases.114  Senator Hatch 
claimed the bill was attempting to “reform[]” federal habeas corpus in 
such a way as to lessen “frivolous appeals.”115  This provision was also 
seen as reducing the perceived welter of state convictions overturned by 
habeas proceedings.116  Section 2254(d) limits habeas review solely to 
lower-court decisions that are (1) “an unreasonable application of[] 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” 
and (2) to decisions “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”117  The 
                                                          
111 Id. 
112 WALKER, supra note 109, at 150.  Although Walker admits that some shifting will 
occur, he believes that such displacement does not interfere with efforts to control 
discretion.  Id. 
113 Id. 
114 28 U.S.C §  2254(d) (2000). The statute provides as follows: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim– 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in  light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
Id. 
115 141 CONG. REC. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Larry W. 
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 398, n.52 (1996). 
116 See, e.g., Note, Rewriting the Great Writ:  Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the 
New 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1876-77 (1997). 
117 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(2). 
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statute circumscribes the ability to apply later precedent to state 
convictions retroactively because new decisions are not “clearly 
established Federal law” at the time of the state conviction.118 
Since the legislation took effect, access to habeas relief has been 
further narrowed by Supreme Court cases that tighten the 
understanding of the phrase “clearly established Federal law.”119  The 
Court defines “clearly established Federal law” as “the holdings . . . of 
. . . [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision.”120  Although there is some disagreement, even within 
the Court, about how the phrase “‘clearly established’ at the time” 
should be parsed,121 none of the Justices disagree with the idea that this 
added requirement was intended to further restrict access to reviewing 
courts.  Generally, courts indicate that habeas courts cannot expand the 
law beyond published decisions of the Supreme Court. 
Thus, federal courts affected by AEDPA are denied the usual way of 
proceeding in legal cases marked by the interplay between facts and law.  
Justice Scalia has observed that the law cannot change in this situation.122  
The reviewing court (including the Supreme Court) must apply the law 
as it has been previously determined by the Supreme Court.123  If change 
in law cannot be countenanced by a reviewing court, it seems that 
AEDPA places all habeas review in a structural position that bears strong 
resemblance to the role of courts described by Jerome Frank.124  The law 
is held constant, and it cannot change; all that matters is how lower 
courts apply settled law to the facts presented.  The facts, of course, can 
and do change, but the assumption underlying section 2254(d) is that 
facts do not and cannot change the law. 
A model helps explain how settled law operates under this view of 
section 2254(d).  Imagine a stainless steel delivery system.  Facts are fed 
into the shiny legal apparatus which routes them (perhaps by means of 
                                                          
118 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia defines 
the legal requirement as limiting precedent that can be cited to that which is “‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the [lower court] decision.”  Id.  By contrast, Justice O’Connor 
maintains in the majority opinion that it is sufficient that the prior case merely be before the 
Court on habeas review.  Id. at 522.  “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, . . . we therefore 
made no new law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim.” Id. 
122 Id. at 543. 
123 See Williams, 529 U.S at 412. 
124 See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (describing Professor Frank’s position on 
the role of courts). 
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pneumatic tubes) through the already-established legal calculus and 
deposits them into two groups.  In group one, relief can be granted.  In 
group two, no relief can be granted.  The law itself has an impenetrable 
and impermeable quality.  The legal norms adopted in earlier cases 
determine which facts matter and which do not.  These norms are 
unvarying and relatively easily identified; therefore, courts can apply 
these rules to facts presented without ambiguity. 
Adoption of the model presented above should cause federal courts 
to dispose of habeas cases quickly.  The provision would give finality to 
lower-court judgments; it would limit unwarranted expansion of the 
law, and it would severely restrict the grounds for any reviewing court’s 
decision.  Similar factual situations would necessarily result in similar 
dispositions.  To see if the law works as proposed, it is fair to ask:  Is 
judicial discretion curtailed by limiting the legal norms that are applied 
or do courts circumvent this restriction? 
Any enunciated legal rule is vague in the absence of a factual basis 
that thickens its description and provides a context for comparison.  
Without the context of the crime and representation narratives described 
above, the rule announced in Strickland is unclear.  Once the underlying 
facts are taken into account, legal interpretation acts as a dynamic 
process and norms and facts “condition” each other as noted by Paul 
Ricouer, who posits: 
[T]he interpretation of the facts and the interpretation of 
the norm mutually condition each other[]. . . . If we 
begin with the interpretation of the facts, we cannot 
overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of 
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say, 
recounted. . . . We never finish untangling the lines of 
the personal story of an accused with certainty, and even 
reading it in such a way is already oriented by the 
presumption that such an interconnectedness places the 
case under some rule.  To say that a is a case of B is 
already to decide that the juridical syllogism holds for 
it.125 
Thus, the facts in the decision define the reach of the holding and permit 
the lawyer to make educated guesses concerning into which category 
ensuing cases will fall. 
                                                          
125 RICOEUR, supra note 15, at 121. 
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IV.  PAUL RICOEUR AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NON-FICTION NARRATIVES 
To analyze narrative, one must consider the work of philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur, whose ground-breaking study of non-fiction narratives 
provides a tool for understanding judicial discretion in the construction 
of facts.126  Ricoeur’s explanation of non-fiction writing explains how 
courts can uphold section 2254 and still exercise discretion by:  (1) 
selecting facts considered relevant; (2) adjusting the scale of abstraction 
when describing historical events; and, (3) retrieving actors and events 
from the refuse heap of the immaterial and casting their role as crucial to 
the narrative.  In short, by changing the description of facts, courts 
change the law significantly. 
A. Language Limits How Written Texts Are Understood 
Although Ricoeur never wrote a systematic jurisprudence, his work 
provides a foundation for lawyers wrestling with historical description 
and limitations imposed by any use of language.  Ricoeur sees the 
rendering of non-fiction narratives as a complicated, multi-layered, and 
constructive process that undermines any naive apprehension that it is 
possible to record the past unproblematically.  He maintains that there 
are a “multitude of ways a set of interconnected facts can be considered 
and . . .  recounted.”127  This understanding shuns the idea that the facts 
in a case are simply “given.”128  After describing aspects of language that 
underlie any discussion of how texts convey meaning, I will turn to 
Ricoeur’s work that specifically addresses the writing of history.  His 
description of how non-fiction narratives are written explains what 
judges do when they draft facts in appellate decisions.  I will then apply 
the categories developed by Ricoeur to show how the law has changed in 
cases dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Initially, gaps arise between historical events and facts later found by 
a court because understanding a text is as much a matter of “who is the 
reader?” as it is a matter of “what is written down?”  Social sciences have 
                                                          
126 See, e.g, PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE, vol. 3 99-274 (K. Blamey & D. Pellauer 
trans., 1985) [hereinafter RICOEUR, TIME]; PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES, ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ACTION, AND INTERPRETATION (John B. Thomson trans. & 
ed., 1981) [hereinafter RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS]; PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, 
FORGETTING 133-411 (K. Blamey & D. Pellauer trans., 2004) [hereinafter RICOEUR, MEMORY]. 
127 RICOEUR, supra note 15, at 121. 
128 See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG:  REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 26 (2003).  Sontag describes 
Virginia Woolf’s ideas about photography which correspond to this notion of facts as 
“simply” given.  Id. 
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rejected the “strict separation of objectivity and subjectivity.”129  The act 
of reading implies a constant give and take between the reader and the 
text, and any meaning that emerges must take into account not only 
what is written on the page but also what the interpreter brings to the act 
of reading.130  Meaning is conveyed not only by what the author means 
but also by what the reader understands. 
This understanding of how meaning arises from the page bears on 
legal analysis, because law is itself a product of language, laden with 
traps for the unwary.  Lawyers often ignore law’s irreducibly linguistic 
basis.  In so doing, attorneys unwittingly accept assumptions about the 
ability to use language in an unambiguous way.  Thus, facts are seen as 
mere “givens,” an assumption which ignores the toil necessary to 
translate historical events into words on a printed page.  As professional 
writers know, simplicity in expression, if it is to be had at all, is not the 
result of a starting position that assumes the ease of accurate description; 
rather, only by working through the difficulties inherent in any use of 
language can one arrive at any level of clarity.  To use language is 
necessarily to be selective; to say something precisely is to be sensitive 
both to the multiple ways words can be used and the contexts in which 
words are uttered.131  Accurate transmission of meaning, saying exactly 
what one means, is difficult to attain.132 
                                                          
129 ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., BEYOND THE GREAT STORY:  HISTORY AS TEXT AND 
DISCOURSE 1 (1998).  Berkhofer states: 
Although the linguistic, interpretive, and rhetorical turns differed from 
one another, all questioned the received viewpoint grounding the 
social sciences:  an ideal of scientific positivism and its corollary, the 
strict separation of objectivity and subjectivity, whether as fact versus 
value or as empiricism versus political and moral advocacy.  Each of 
the three turns stressed language, meaning, and interpretation as 
central to human understanding and therefore to understanding 
humans. 
Id. 
130 HANS GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 236 (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall 
trans., 2d ed. 2003).  Gadamer states: 
[I]t is necessary to keep one’s gaze fixed on the thing throughout all 
the distractions that originate in the interpreter himself.  A person who 
is trying to understand a text is always projecting.  He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning 
emerges in the text.  Again, the initial meaning emerges only because 
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain 
meaning.  Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised 
in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there. 
Id. 
131 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 44.  Ricoeur explains: 
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1. Ambiguity is Rooted in the Predicate Rather Than in the Subject of a 
Sentence 
Ricoeur notes that even the simplest structure for conveying 
meaning—the sentence—can mask layers of ambiguity.133  Sentences are 
made up of two components:  a subject and a predicate.  A subject has 
the task of selecting out something singular; it needs to identify the agent 
that acts or the object which is acted upon by the predicate.134  By 
                                                                                                                                  
[The multiple meanings that can be attached to any given word 
(polysemy) has] as its counterpart the selective role of contexts for 
determining the current value which words assume in a determinate 
message, addressed by a definite speaker to a hearer placed in a 
particular situation.  Sensitivity to context is the necessary complement 
and ineluctable counterpart of polysemy.  But the use of contexts 
involves, in turn, an activity of discernment which is exercised in the 
concrete exchange of messages between interlocutors, and which is 
modelled on the interplay of question and answer.  This activity of 
discernment is properly called interpretation; it consists in recognising 
which relatively univocal [one voice—one meaning] message the 
speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of the common lexicon.  
To produce a relatively univocal discourse with polysemic words, and 
to identify this intention of univocity in the reception of messages:  
such is the first and most elementary work of interpretation. 
Id. 
132 PAUL RICOEUR, INTERPRETATION THEORY:  DISCOURSE AND THE SURPLUS OF MEANING 
15-16 (1976).  He states: 
[W]hat is experienced by one person cannot be transferred whole as 
such and such experience to someone else.  My experience cannot 
directly become your experience.  An event belonging to one stream of 
consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another stream of 
consciousness. Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you.  
Something is transferred from one sphere of life to another. This 
something is not the experience as experienced, but its meaning. Here 
is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, 
but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. 
Id. 
133 See, e.g., RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 11.  For Ricoeur, meaning is conveyed only in 
sentences; words by themselves are necessarily polysemic and unable to convey meaning 
clearly in the absence of a broader context.  Id.  See also RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 
126, at 169.  He explains: 
[T]he semantics of the word [discourse] demonstrates very clearly that 
words acquire an actual meaning only in a sentence and that lexical 
entities – the words of the dictionary – have merely potential meanings 
in virtue of their potential uses in typical contexts. . . . At the lexical 
level, words . . . have more than one meaning; it is only by a specific 
contextual action of sifting that they realise, in a given sentence, a part 
of their potential semantics and acquire what we call a determinate 
meaning. 
Id. 
134 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 10-11.  The author says: 
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contrast, the predicate is ineluctably plural.  It describes and designates 
“a kind of quality . . . a type of relation, or a type of action.”135  Why is 
this distinction important?  For Ricoeur, ambiguity, generality, and 
unclear antecedents can arise in the subject, but such confusion presents 
a comparatively obvious difficulty.  First year law students are relatively 
adept at sorting out subjects of statutes that seem over or under-
inclusive.  Ricoeur draws attention to the predicate as a source of 
confusion.  Unless predication is crisply distinguished, and unless the 
level of abstraction is carefully monitored and controlled, the same 
predicate can and will describe a number of different actions.  For 
example, to say that an attorney “argued for a position” encompasses 
both a dismissive two minute disagreement with opposing counsel and a 
painstaking and elegant elaboration of how years of precedent compel 
the court to only one conclusion. 
Ricoeur’s work suggests that trivial legal ambiguities are those 
which arise from defining the subject of an action; by contrast, 
ambiguities which require greater attention will be those which arise 
from broad predication.  For example, the Strickland majority describes 
Tunkey as arguing five separate points at sentencing.136  A casual reader 
would believe that counsel did a great deal here.  Yet, the opinion fails to 
mention that his whole argument took up less than three pages of the 
                                                                                                                                  
Subject and predicate do not do the same job in the proposition.  The 
subject picks out something singular – Peter, London, this table . . . – 
by means of several grammatical devices which serve this logical 
function:  proper names, pronouns, demonstratives, (this and that . . . ) 
and “definite descriptions” (the so and so).  What they all have in 
common is that they all identify one and only one item. 
Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984).  The Court explains: 
At the sentencing hearing, counsel’s strategy was based primarily on 
the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy as well as on his 
reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it important for a 
convicted defendant to own up to his crime.  Counsel argued that 
respondent’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing 
him from the death penalty.  Counsel also argued that respondent had 
no history of criminal activity and that respondent committed the 
crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, thus coming 
within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances.  He further 
argued that respondent should be spared death because he had 
surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a codefendant 
and because respondent was fundamentally a good person who had 
briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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transcript and likely lasted less than four or five minutes.137  This fact, 
once realized, undermines the image of zealousness projected by the 
majority opinion. 
2. Texts Convey Meaning through Propositional Content 
Another difficulty in moving from the historical event of dialogue to 
the written page emerges from the gap between what Paul Grice calls the 
“utterer’s meaning” and the “utterance meaning.”138  Ordinarily, people 
give pride of interpretive place to the psychological intent of the author 
or speaker.  This attribution stems from the way of resolving 
misunderstandings in the dialogical situation.  When a statement is 
misunderstood in conversation, the speaker employs a number of 
strategies for clarification.  First she attempts to clear up a 
misunderstanding by using other words.  If this attempt is insufficient to 
remove the difficulty in understanding the statement, the speaker points 
to some reality outside of the conversation itself.139  The force of this 
approach lies not with the propositional content of spoken statements 
but emphasizes rather the correspondence with external reality which is 
either physically indicated or suggested by reference to unspoken 
                                                          
137 Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 9. 
138 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 12-13.  Ricoeur says: 
To mean is both what the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say, 
and what the sentence means, i.e., what the conjunction between the 
identification function and the predicative function yields. . . . We may 
connect the reference of discourse to its speaker with the event side of 
the dialectic.  The event is somebody speaking.  In this sense, the 
system or code is anonymous to the extent that it is merely virtual.  
Languages do not speak, people do.  But the propositional side of the 
self-reference of discourse must not be overlooked if the utterer’s 
meaning, to use a term of Paul Grice’s, is not to be reduced to a mere 
psychological intention.  The mental meaning can be found nowhere 
else than in discourse itself.  The utterer’s meaning has its mark in the 
utterance meaning. 
Id. 
139 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 141.  Ricoeur explains: 
In oral discourse, the problem is ultimately resolved by the ostensive 
function of discourse; in other words, reference is determined by the 
ability to point to a reality common to the interlocutors.  If we cannot 
point to the thing about which we speak, at least we can situate it in 
relation to the unique spatio-temporal network which is shared by the 
interlocutors.  It is the ‘here’ and ‘now’, determined by the situation of 
discourse, which provides the ultimate reference of all discourse. 
Id. 
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common sense notions, what Habermas would call an appeal to the “life-
world.”140 
B. The Author is Erased:  Three Phases of Distanciation 
As one moves from spoken to written language, the key for 
understanding is not “what is said” and “who says it,” but “what is 
written” and “who reads it.”  Ricoeur observes: 
What happens to discourse when it passes from 
speaking to writing?  At first sight, writing seems only to 
introduce a purely external and material factor:  fixation, 
which shelters the event of discourse from destruction.  
In fact, fixation is only the external appearance of a 
problem which is much more important, and which 
affects all the properties of discourse. . . . [W]riting 
renders the text autonomous with respect to the 
intention of the author.  What the text signifies no longer 
coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, 
textual meaning and psychological meaning have 
different destinies.141 
Writing not only takes the moment of speech and commits it to paper; it 
also unhinges the words in the text from the restrictions of persons, 
                                                          
140 Gregory O’Meara, Habermas, Violence, and the Ultimate Reality and Meaning of Law, 26 J. 
ULTIMATE REALITY & MEANING 180, 184-85 (2003).  The article specifies: 
‘Lifeworld’ refers to the social, intellectual, and even instinctive context 
from which all of us act.  From the beginning of our lives, 
communicative acts occur within a horizon, a background, of shared 
beliefs, experiences, actions and thoughts.  This background 
knowledge is not consciously perceived; we are, by definition, as 
unaware of the lifeworld as we are of the air we breathe.  Nevertheless, 
we make use of the lifeworld’s horizon in arriving at decisions daily.  
For example, most persons in first world countries assume that all 
water that comes out of a faucet is potable.  Our daily actions, 
decisions, and expectations, individually and collectively, depend 
upon this shared knowledge, even though we rarely consciously 
apprehend that fact.  More generally, because we are unaware of the 
contents of the lifeworld, these contents may also be the source for 
minor dissent; however, when these contents are consciously 
recognized, persons are able either to set dissent rooted in 
misunderstanding aside and enter into consensus with others, or they 
recognize better the area of disagreement and enter into further 
discussion. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
141 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 139. 
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space, and time.142  What matters to the reader is not what the author 
intended to say but what words are written on the paper in front of her.  
The dialogical situation no longer exists between the speaker and the 
hearer; it now occurs between the reader and the words of the printed 
text.  The reader cares not what the “utterer” meant; she is concerned 
rather with how to decode the “utterance.” 
1. Dialogue is with the Text and Not with the Author 
Reliance upon the written word necessarily entails the three-part 
phenomenon Ricoeur calls “distanciation.”  The first stage of 
distanciation maintains that the author is cut from the understanding of 
the text itself.143  Ricoeur insists that readers approach the text as a free-
standing object.144  The absence of the author as a dialogue partner 
compels the reader to enter into a dialogue with the propositional 
content of the text itself.145  A written text, by its very nature, limits the 
                                                          
142 See generally PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 25-44. Ricoeur identifies three important 
changes which occur when a text is written down.  Id.  First, the text is separated from the 
person of the author.  Id.  Second, the text is separated from its original audience, and third, 
it is separated from its original situation or context.  Id.  Each of these points of 
distanciation can be the locus for misunderstanding which is ineluctably tied up in the 
nature of written discourse.  Id. 
143 Id. at 29-30.  Ricoeur states: 
With written discourse, however, the author’s intention and the 
meaning of the text cease to coincide.  This dissociation of the verbal 
meaning of the text and the mental intention of the author gives to the 
concept of inscription its decisive significance, beyond the mere 
fixation of previous oral discourse.  Inscription becomes synonymous 
with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results from the 
disconnection of the mental intention of the author from the verbal 
meaning of the text, of what the author meant and what the text 
means. . . . What the text means now matters more than what the 
author meant when he wrote it. 
Id. 
144 Id. at 26.  In describing how readers approach the text Ricoeur states: 
This inscription, substituted for the immediate vocal, physiognomic, or 
gestural expression, is in itself a tremendous cultural achievement.  
The human fact disappears.  Now material “marks” convey the 
message.  This cultural achievement concerns the event character of 
discourse first and subsequently the meaning as well.  It is because 
discourse only exists in a temporal and present instance of discourse 
that it may flee as speech or be fixed as writing. 
Id. 
145 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 146-47.  He explains: 
It does not suffice to say that reading is a dialogue with the author 
through his work, for the relation of the reader to the book is of a 
completely different nature.  Dialogue is an exchange of questions and 
answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the 
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author’s ability to control how the reader interprets her words.  In oral 
communication, the author controls the message insofar as she can 
clarify disagreements and ambiguities.  Where the sole source for 
avoiding ambiguity is the written word, the logic revealed by the 
propositional content is the only path readers can use to clear up 
difficulties with the meaning.146 
2. The Reader Provides Her Own Context 
Ricoeur describes the second stage of distanciation, which explains 
how meaning rests largely in the reader’s individual life experience: 
[W]ritten discourse creates an audience which extends in 
principle to anyone who can read.  The freeing of the 
written material with respect to the dialogical condition 
of discourse is the most significant effect of writing.  It 
implies that the relation between writing and reading is 
no longer a particular case of the relation between 
speaking and hearing.147 
The locus of meaning in interpretation of written texts shifts from the 
pen of the writer to the eye of the reader.  Unlike a speech event which is 
addressed to a particular hearer, “a written text is addressed to an 
unknown reader and potentially to whoever knows how to read.”148  
One must also consider the reader’s biography and what the reader 
                                                                                                                                  
reader.  The writer does not respond to the reader.  Rather, the book 
divides the act of writing and the act of reading into two sides, 
between which there is no communication.  The reader is absent from 
the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading.  The text 
thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer.  It thereby 
replaces the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the voice of 
one to the hearing of the other. 
Id. 
146 Id. at 141.  In particular, Ricoeur states: 
[W]hat happens to reference when discourse becomes a text?  Here we 
find that writing, and above all the structure of the work, modify 
reference to the point of rendering it entirely problematic.  In oral 
discourse, the problem is ultimately resolved by the ostensive function 
of discourse; in other words, reference is determined by the ability to 
point to a reality common to the interlocutors.  If we cannot point to 
the thing about which we speak, at least we can situate it in relation to 
the unique spatio-temporal network which is shared by the 
interlocutors.  It is the ‘here’ and ‘now’, determined by the situation of 
discourse, which provides the ultimate reference of all discourse. 
Id. 
147 Id. at 139. 
148 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 31. 
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herself brings to a particular text.149  What a reader brings to a text will 
color her interpretation, and these interpretations have an undeniable 
validity from Ricoeur’s perspective.  “It is part of the meaning of a text to 
be open to an indefinite number of readers and, therefore, of 
interpretations.”150  To understand what a text means is, in part, to 
understand how the reader processes the information. 
3. The Author’s Context is Erased 
The third mode of distanciation occurs because the text is wrested 
from the original situation of the author.  The reader does not share the 
same space and time coordinates as the author.  Ricoeur describes the 
common context as “shattered by writing.”151  Because gaps between 
what an author intends and what a reader perceives cannot be addressed 
at the time of perceived ambiguity, these difficulties can infect all later 
understanding (or lack thereof) between the author and the reader.  The 
reader’s understanding will, therefore, be grounded not only in the 
written text but also by the reader’s own situation, which may differ 
vastly from that of the writer. 
These three phases of distanciation lead to a central paradox:  the 
meaning of a text can differ from the stated purpose of an author.  
Ricoeur states: 
The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility 
that what Gadamer calls the “matter” of the text may 
escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author; 
in other words, thanks to writing, the “world” of the text 
may explode the world of the author. [Emphasis in 
original].152 
                                                          
149 GADAMER, supra note 130, at 267.  Gadamer states: 
[I]t is necessary to keep one’s gaze fixed on the thing throughout all 
the distractions that originate in the interpreter himself.  A person who 
is trying to understand a text is always projecting.  He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning 
emerges in the text.  Again, the initial meaning emerges only because 
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain 
meaning.  Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised 
in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there. 
Id. 
150 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 31-32. 
151 Id. at 35. 
152 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 139. 
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The words used by the author may in fact bear more weight and convey 
“more meaning” than the author intended.  By using language, a writer 
constantly refers back to a tradition, a history of texts laden with 
references and allusions of which he is ignorant.  These references and 
allusions may subvert textual coherence by introducing meanings far 
different from the author’s intent.153  We cannot and do not control all 
that a reader may take from our words. 
Despite the destabilization that emerges from moving from the 
spoken to the written word, Ricoeur maintains that truth exists and is 
attainable in written work, but such attainment is the result of more than 
words inscribed on paper.154  Even in spoken discourse, the limitations of 
language do not guarantee that ideas will be received without ambiguity 
and distortion: 
[W]hat is experienced by one person cannot be 
transferred whole as such and such experience to 
someone else.  My experience cannot directly become 
your experience.  An event belonging to one stream of 
consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another 
stream of consciousness.155 
Truth is not unproblematically conveyed through the force of one 
author’s words.  Rather, truth emerges out of the recorded confluence of 
many lives.  It is the result of inductive and empirical study and 
indicated by the weight of experience; it is not a conclusion that can be 
deduced through sheer force of will or the careful manipulation of verbal 
formulae.  Ricoeur maintains that the whole truth can never be fully 
known.156  There is always more that can be said. 
                                                          
153 See id. at 174 (arguing, “the text is an autonomous space of meaning which is no 
longer animated by the intention of its author; the autonomy of the text, deprived of this 
essential support, hands writing over to the sole interpretation of the reader.”). 
154 See, e.g., RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 498.  Ricoeur writes that: 
[E]vents like the Holocaust and the great crimes of the twentieth 
century, situated at the limits of representation, stand in the name of 
all the events that have left their traumatic imprint on hearts and 
bodies:  they protest that they were and as such they demand being 
said, recounted, understood.  This protestation, which nourishes 
attestation, is part of belief:  it can be contested but not refuted. 
Id. 
155 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16. 
156 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 498. 
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C. Writing History as a Three Step Process 
These limitations besetting every written text are, of course, true for 
every statement of fact recounted in appellate decisions.  Appellate legal 
decisions are almost uniformly reduced to writing.  Law, like history, is 
inseparable from its written roots.157  To describe a historical event using 
words is to recognize that words are not the same as the event itself.  
There will be slippage in the transmission of meaning because the hearer 
or reader’s imaginative reconstruction of the event will not convey the 
same immediacy experienced by the original witnesses.158  Details will be 
ignored or misconstrued; emotions will be dampened.  Further, the 
move from trial to transcript to appellate decision results in even greater 
distance from the historical event.  To reduce the oral and aural 
performance of a trial into a silent transcript that is later distilled down 
into an appellate opinion is to further narrow the ability of the reader to 
apprehend the original event in its complexity and ambiguity.159 
Ricoeur divides the writing of non-fiction into three phases:  (1) the 
documentary or archival phase, which deals with the collection of 
information; (2) the explanatory phase, which consists of a chain of 
“because” answers to “why” questions emerging from the information 
collected; and, (3) the narrative phase, where information is put into 
written form for future readers.160  These elements distinguish the 
writing of non-fiction from the writing of fiction.161  He notes, “[u]nlike 
                                                          
157 See id. at 138.  “Writing, in effect, is the threshold of language that historical knowing 
has already crossed, in distancing itself from memory to undertake the three-fold 
adventure of archival research, explanation, and representation.  History is writing from 
one end to another.”  Id. 
158 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16. 
159 I thank Professor Daniel Blinka for highlighting this distinction for me. 
160 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 136. Ricoeur notes that this triadic structure is 
taken largely from the work of Michel de Certeau.  Id.  Ricoeur states:  “I have also adopted 
the broader lines of the triadic structure of Certeau’s essay, although I give them different 
contents on some important points.”  Id.; see also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE WRITING OF 
HISTORY (T. Conley trans., 1988). 
161 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 136-37.  Ricoeur describes the documentary 
phase as follows: 
I shall call the “documentary phase” the one that runs from the 
declaration of eyewitnesses to the constituting of archives, which takes 
as its epistemological program the establishing of documentary proof 
. . . .  Next I shall call the explanation/understanding . . . phase the one 
that has to do with the multiple uses of the connective “because” 
responding to the question “why?” . . . Finally, I shall call the 
“representative phase” the putting into literary or written form of 
discourse offered to the readers of history. . . . [I]t is the phase of 
writing that plainly states the historian’s intention, which is to 
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novels, historians’ constructions do aim at being reconstructions of the 
past.”162  Because the statement of facts in any appellate decision aims at 
being “reconstructions” or representations of the past, Ricoeur’s 
phenomenology of a historian’s work explains what judges do. 
These three phases of non-fiction writing are “methodological 
moments” rather than “distinct chronological stages” that necessarily 
follow one after the other.163  For example, the introduction of 
unexpected facts may require recasting the proposed explanation to 
account for their occurrence.  Similarly, the adoption of a particular 
narrative strategy often sends the author back to the archive to look for 
further evidence of her thesis.  The recounting of history is a dynamic, 
and not a static, phenomenon, and these phases of historical drafting are 
continually interwoven and repeated as non-fiction writing continues.164  
Ricoeur notes:  “Each of the three operations of the historiographical 
operation stands as a base for the other two, inasmuch as they serve 
successively as referents for the other two.”165  Although the following 
analysis will treat each phase as relatively autonomous, the three are 
inseparable in operation. 
1. The Documentary Phase 
Initially, Ricoeur’s description of the documentary phase, i.e., the 
collection of information, draws explicit parallels between the work of an 
historian and the operation of a court system.166 As at trial, the 
documentary phase is defined by the use of witnesses, both human and 
textual.167  The question to be determined at this phase is one of 
credibility:  “Whom or what should we believe and why?”168  To address 
                                                                                                                                  
represent the past just as it happened–whatever meaning may be 
assigned to this  “just as.”  It is also at this third phase that the major 
aporias of memory return in force to the foreground, the aporia of the 
representation of an absent thing that occurred previously and that of 
a practice devoted to the active recalling of the past, which history 
elevates to the level of a reconstruction. 
Id. 
162 RICOEUR, TIME, supra note 126, at 142. 
163 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 137. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 162-69. 
167 Id. at 162.  “It is within the everyday use of testimony that the common core of its 
juridical and historical use is most easily discerned.”  Id. 
168 Id.  Ricoeur descusses witness credibility, positing: 
[T]o what point is testimony trustworthy?  This question balances both 
confidence and suspicion.  Thus it is by bringing to light the conditions 
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that question, Ricoeur proposes a dialectic between the introduction and 
the reception of evidence.169  As in dialogue, the question and answer 
format is the vehicle that moves the gathering of information along. 
Ricoeur focuses particularly on the reception of evidence by 
describing the historian sifting through archived facts as the finder of 
fact at trial.170  Because Ricoeur understands history according to a 
judicial model, a hermeneutic of suspicion is unavoidably woven into 
the fabric of recording past events.171  Beginning with the immediate 
perception of historical events, every description, every recounting 
received by a listener, is considered in a context alert to flaws in 
perception or transmission of information.  Witnesses are scrutinized for 
distortions in their abilities to perceive, reasons to doubt their sincerity, 
and impediments to their memory.172  Every connection between 
different pieces of evidence is scrutinized as the historian tries to bring 
order to the disconnected documents scattered before her.  The attitude 
of suspicion has no ending point so long as historians draw breath.  
Indeed, Ricoeur observes that one difference between history and 
judicial findings of fact is the necessary cessation of inquiry at some 
                                                                                                                                  
in which suspicion is fomented that we have a chance of approaching 
the core meaning of testimony. 
Id.  Of course, trials need not be about issues of credibility.  Often there is no disagreement 
about the facts themselves.  Rather, the parties dispute what inferences should be drawn 
from the facts as established.  For simplicity’s sake, it seems best to focus on issues of 
credibility for the purposes of this paper, but understand that this limitation leaves a host 
of issues unexplored. 
169 Id. at 163.  Proposing a dialectic between the introduction and the reception of 
evidence, Ricoeur states: 
Two sides are initially distinguished and articulated in terms of one 
another:  on the one side, the assertion of the factual reality of the 
reported event; on the other, the certification or authentification of the 
declaration on the basis of its author’s experience, what we can call his 
presumed trustworthiness. 
Id. 
170 Id. at 161-66. 
171 Id. at 162.  Ricoeur explains: 
In effect, suspicion unfolds itself all along the chain of operations that 
begin at the level of the perception of an experienced scene, continuing 
on to that of the retention of its memory, to come to focus in the 
declarative and narrative phase of the restitution of the features of the 
event. 
Id. 
172 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601-603.  These attributes are among those regularly probed by 
cross-examiners in a trial court and underlie policies in the Federal Rules of Evidence, such 
as the rules defining the competency of witnesses.  Id. 
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point in judicial proceedings.173  While history is constantly re-
interrogated and revised, legal descriptions of events are relatively more 
stable because of the principle of finality of judgment.174 
Ricoeur sees a witness’ presence at the described historical event and 
reputation for trustworthiness as strategies for addressing this pervasive 
suspicion.  Although he alludes to the substance of the evidence to be 
introduced, his approach emphasizes more the qualities of the witness 
rather than the content of the witness’ testimony.175  In this vein, Ricoeur 
suggests that the witness’ spatio-temporal location and ability to narrate 
a coherent story carries more weight than does factual correspondence 
with the historical events described.176  The act of testifying combines 
both the historical event to be recounted and the biography of the 
testifying witness.177  Insofar as the witness has lived a life of 
comparative virtue, her personal ethos or trustworthiness imbues her 
testimony with a prima facie believability.  Similarly, insofar as a 
witness’ life has failed to be marked by truthfulness, her testimony will 
correspondingly be received with disbelief.178 
                                                          
173 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 319-20.  Commenting on the difference between 
history and judicial proceedings, Ricoeur states: 
It remains that the definitive character of the verdict marks the most 
obvious difference between the juridical approach and the 
historiographical approach to the same events:  what has been judged 
can be challenged by popular opinion, but not retried; non bis idem; as 
for the review of the decision, it “cuts only one way.” 
Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 163-64. 
176 Id.  In discussing the relationship between the witness and her testimony, Ricoeur 
argues: 
The specificity of testimony consists in the fact that the assertion of 
reality is inseparable from its being paired with the self-designation of 
the testifying subject.  The typical formulation of testimony proceeds 
from this pairing:  I was there.  What is attested to is indivisibly the 
reality of the past thing and the presence of the narrator at the place of 
its occurrence.  And it is the witness who first declares himself to be a 
witness. . . . These . . . assertions link point-like testimony to the whole 
history of a life.  At the same time, the self-designation brings to the 
surface the inextricable opacity of a personal history that itself has 
been “enmeshed in stories.” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
177 Id. 
178 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), 404-05. Again, Ricoeur’s approach finds an echo in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id.  Rules 404 and 405 set forth a general rule that litigants may 
not use a witness’ character or character trait to establish circumstantial proof of the 
historical events of a case.  Id.  Nevertheless, courts do permit relying on a witness’ 
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The reputation or character of a witness is likewise seen as relevant 
under current evidence law.  Although trials shun introduction of 
collateral matters as a general rule, under certain conditions the Federal 
Rules of Evidence permit the jury to learn about the reputation and 
character of a witness, including specific instances of conduct displaying 
truthfulness or untruthfulness in the past.179  At least in this regard, trial 
courts do connect historical events and the lives of those who recount 
them.180  Trial attorneys seem to understand this matter better than 
others.  The litigator constantly asks not only “what is the content of the 
testimony?” but also “who is saying it?”  This factor is noted in Ricoeur’s 
                                                                                                                                  
character trait for untruthfulness to support an assertion that a witness lied on direct 
examination.  Id. 
179 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608-609. 
Rule 608.  Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence 
in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:  
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible 
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character 
the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other 
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’ 
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to 
matters that relate only to character for truthfulness. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 
(a) General rule. 
For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of 
a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted regardless of the punishment . . . . 
Id. 
180 See, e.g., RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 244. 
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comments on narrativity.181  Lives of actors are emplotted along with 
particular events in a story, and the finder of fact may be as convinced by 
the life of an actor as by what she or he says.182 
Turning from the reception of evidence by the finder of fact to the 
introduction of evidence, the witness’ role at the historical event shapes 
her perceptions and affects the record in a case.183  When a witness 
testifies in court, she is a third-person observer, trying to convey to a jury 
what occurred at a particular time and place.184  This third-person role 
may correspond with the witness’ experienced role at the time of the 
event.  It may also differ.  Witnesses understand events giving rise to 
testimony from a particular perspective, a story which explains how 
different events or observations fit together.185  If the witness is a co-
defendant or a victim, there may be an emotional valence conferred by 
that role that impedes the witness’ ability to apprehend and transmit the 
occurrences in question.186 
                                                          
181 Id. 
182 Id.  Discussing the roles of actors in a narrative, Ricoeur states: 
[I]nasmuch as the actors in a narrative–the characters–are emplotted 
along with the story, the notion of narrative identification, correlative 
to that of narrative coherence, too is open to noteworthy transpositions 
on the historical plane.  The notion of a character constitutes a 
narrative operator of the same amplitude as that of an event.  The 
characters perform and suffer from the action recounted. 
Id. 
183 See, e.g., GADAMER, supra note 130, at 276-77.  Commenting on human perceptions, 
Gadamer explains: 
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it.  Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and 
state in which we live.  The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror.  
The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed 
circuits of historical life. 
Id. 
184 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164.  Ricoeur argues: 
Self-designation gets inscribed in an exchange that sets up a dialogical 
situation.  It is before someone that the witness testifies to the reality of 
some scene of which he was part of the audience, perhaps as actor or 
victim, yet, in the moment of testifying, he is in the position of a third-
person observer with regard to all the protagonists of the action. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
185 Id. 
186 Id.  See also JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 58-59 (1990).  Bruner states: 
In the actual effort to remember something, [Bartlett] notes, what most 
often comes first to mind is an affect or a charged “attitude” – that “it” 
was something unpleasant, something that led to embarrassment, 
something that was exciting.  The affect is rather like a general 
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The act of translating a witness’ act of testifying to the written record 
affects emotionally-charged content, because something is lost in the 
transition from live to written testimony; in part, those reading the 
record cannot experience its affective imprint, the emotional content that 
underlies the words spoken.187  The text can only record the 
propositional content of the testimony, i.e., the words the witness says, 
not the quality of her demeanor nor the manner of her delivery.  In 
addition to difficulties associated with transmitting emotional valances 
in a written record, the very act of putting certain experiences into words 
creates certain lacunae.  As Professor Elaine Scarry has observed, 
physical pain is often essentially inexpressible.188  Similarly, mental 
suffering is often impossible to verbalize.189  Witnesses who have 
undergone traumatic experiences are often reduced to incoherent and ill-
defined attempts to express what they cannot articulate.  Courts 
traditionally defer to the trier of fact who has the immediate ability to 
apprehend the demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility, even if 
such understanding is obscured by emotionally laden memories.  
Nevertheless, the difficulty associated with expressing emotionally and 
physically scarring events lessens the impact of such testimony in the 
written record. 
Ricoeur maintains that those testifying are in a dialogical 
relationship not only with the examining attorney but also with the 
finder of fact in court.  Surely, witnesses engage in the question and 
answer format that characterizes all dialogue when they are being 
examined on the witness stand.190  Ricoeur maintains that the question 
                                                                                                                                  
thumbprint of the schema to be reconstructed. “The recall is then a 
construction made largely on the basis of this attitude, and its general 
effect is that of a justification of the attitude.”  Remembering serves, on 
this view, to justify an affect, an attitude.  The act of recall is “loaded,” 
then, fulfilling a “rhetorical” function in the process of reconstructing 
the past.  It is a reconstruction designed to justify.  The rhetoric, as it 
were, even determines the form of “invention” we slip into in 
reconstructing the past:  “The confident subject justifies himself–attains 
a rationalization, so to speak–by setting down more detail than was 
actually present; while the cautious, hesitating subject reacts in the 
opposite manner, and finds his justification by diminishing rather than 
increasing the details presented [in the experiment].” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
187 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164.  “[T]he affective imprint of an event capable 
of striking the witness like a blow does not necessarily coincide with the importance his 
audience may attach to his testimony.”  Id. 
188 See ELAINE SCARRY, RESISTING REPRESENTATION 3 (1994). 
189 See, e.g., JEROME A. MILLER, THE WAY OF SUFFERING:  A GEOGRAPHY OF CRISIS 46 (1988). 
190 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 14-15. 
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and answer structure extends further.  Witnesses make assertions, and 
every assertion necessarily implies the question:  “And you agree, don’t 
you?”191  Similarly, every witness’ testimony contains the plea, “believe 
me.”192  To be a witness is to subject one’s self to challenge not only by 
the cross-examiner but also by the finder of fact.  “The witness is thus the 
one who accepts being questioned and expected to answer what may 
turn out to be a criticism of what he says.”193  There is a tension, a fear of 
being contradicted or proven wrong, built into every statement made at 
trial and in every assertion in documents upon which a historian relies. 
The back and forth of a dialogical relationship that characterizes trial 
transcripts drops out of judicial opinions reduced to writing, because, 
almost uniformly, judges adopt a third-person omniscient perspective 
for their published work.  Thus, the written decision seems more a 
pronouncement of self-evident truths than the product of ineluctably 
provisional dialogue.  In this regard, well-crafted opinions and histories 
have an aura of inevitability about them.  The reader is lulled into letting 
down her hermeneutic guard and accepting a coherent account as “true” 
without interrogating suspicions either discarded or consciously avoided 
by the author. 
Ricoeur’s description of the documentary phase undermines any 
claim that there is an easy and accurate transition from historical events 
to testimony presented in a courtroom.  Recognition of the dynamics 
underlying the presentation of evidence at trial highlights the 
significance of the findings of fact by the trial court.  In the absence of 
                                                                                                                                  
One important aspect of discourse is that it is addressed to someone.  
There is another speaker who is the addressee of the discourse.  The 
presence of the pair, speaker and hearer, constitutes language as 
communication. . . . Questioning and answering sustain the movement 
and the dynamic of speaking, and in one sense they do not constitute 
one mode of discourse among others.  Each illocutionary act is a kind 
of question.  To assert something is to expect agreement, just as to give 
an order is to expect obedience. 
Id. 
191 Id. 
192 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164.  Commenting on the trust involved in 
witness testimony, Ricoeur states: 
This dialogical structure immediately makes clear the dimension of 
trust involved:  the witness asks to be believed.  He does not limit 
himself to saying “I was there,” he adds “believe me.”  Certification of 
the testimony then is not complete except through the echo response of 
the one who receives the testimony and accepts it.  Then the testimony 
is not just certified, it is accredited. 
Id. 
193 Id. at 165. 
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specific findings at trial, the appellate court must craft a coherent 
narrative from a transcript that is stripped of emotional valances and 
observations of witness demeanor.  The collection of raw materials for 
legal facts is the first locus of judicial discretion in determining the facts 
in a case. 
2. The Explanatory Phase 
a. Selection of Facts Determines the Theory 
Moving from the documentary to the explanatory phase, the initial 
consideration is the selection of “salient” facts recovered in the archival 
stage.  Historian Tzvetan Todorov observes: 
“The work of the historian, like every work on the past, 
never consists solely in establishing the facts but also in 
choosing certain among them as being more salient and 
more significant than others, then placing them in 
relation to one another. . . .”194 
Facts are necessarily theory-laden.  Matters are not seen as significant, 
save in reference to a backdrop, a context which will either subordinate 
or emphasize the fact in question.  Amsterdam and Bruner observe that 
certain stories fail to capture our attention because they conform to 
societal expectations.195  They call such stories “scripts” that involve 
“familiar characters taking appropriate actions in typical settings.”196  
Insofar as what arises in the archives or court record appears to be part 
of a script, it will not lead to questions to be answered in the explanatory 
phase.  Specifically, Ricoeur states: 
[T]he document sleeping in the archives is not just silent, 
it is an orphan.  The testimonies it contains are detached 
from the authors who “gave birth” to them.  They are 
handed over to the care of those who are competent to 
question them and hence to defend them, by giving 
them aid and assistance.197 
Only facts which subvert or undermine expectations appear to have 
explanatory force; other facts are ignored as part of the normal 
                                                          
194 TZVETAN TODOROV, LES ABUS DE LA MEMOIRE 50 (1995), in RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra 
note 126, at 86. 
195 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 45. 
196 Id. 
197 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 169. 
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background of life.198  The author releases these “subversive facts” from 
the “orphanage” of an archive or the appellate record.  But to recognize a 
fact as having explanatory force, one must already possess at least an 
inchoate theory of explanation. 
Judges must be selective to do their job properly.  The record in 
complex litigation can run to hundreds and even thousands of volumes.  
Even a relatively simple murder transcript can take up many banker’s 
boxes.  As the judge and her clerk sift through volumes of testimony, 
they will, consciously or not, recognize particular facts as more 
important than others, and this recognition filters out certain 
explanations.  Insofar as particular facts are left dormant in the archive 
or record, they cannot become the basis for a decision, and the reader of 
the final opinion will never know that this “orphaned” fact was 
established in the trial court.  The selection of facts as relevant 
determines what explanations are possible, what reasons the court can 
adopt. 
b. Theoretical versus Practical Reasoning 
On a more abstract level, there are two different styles of reasoning 
employed in the explanatory phase.199  One approach is called theoretical 
reasoning, and the other is called practical reasoning.200  Theoretical 
                                                          
198 BRUNER, supra note 186, at 47-50.  Jerome Bruner notes elsewhere that a crucial feature 
of narrative is “that it specializes in the forging of links between the exceptional and the 
ordinary.”  Id. at 47.  Part of what a narrative must do is give reasons or “make sense” of 
any “encountered exception.”  Id. at 49.  Deviations from the expected must be justified in a 
way that the ordinary need not be.  Id. at 47-50.  “It is this achievement that gives a story 
verisimilitude.”  Id. at 50. 
199 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 182.  Commenting on the explanatory phase, 
Ricoeur states: 
To explain, generally speaking, is to answer the question “Why?” 
through a variety of uses of the connector “because.” . . . If the intellect, 
however, is to remain within the domain of history, and not slip over 
into that of fiction, this use of the imagination [which carries our 
minds] . . . far beyond the sphere of private and public memory into 
the range of the possible . . . must submit itself to a specific discipline, 
namely, an appropriate dividing up of its objects of reference.” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
200 See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY, A 
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 22-46 (1988).  These two approaches are distinguished and 
discussed at great length.  Id.  See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (1969).  Of 
course, there are more refined explanatory methods that can be relied upon at this stage.  
Id.  Wittgenstein, among others, warned against the idea that only one set of methods 
yielded certainty.  Id.  Instead, he noted that there are many different sorts of uncertainty, 
and we have different ways of approaching them.  Id.  See also RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra 
note 126, at 184-85.  Ricoeur agrees with Wittgenstein’s observation: 
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reasoning describes the elegant and precise calculus displayed in 
geometric proofs.201  It begins with unquestioned general principles from 
which all other conclusions can be derived.  Theoretical reasoning is 
attractive because its conclusions must be accepted if one concedes the 
premises.  Unfortunately, theoretical reasoning is of limited applicability 
because it deals only with the idealized, the atemporal, and the 
necessary.202  Theoretical reasoning is informative and helpful when 
                                                                                                                                  
[T]here is no one privileged mode of explanation in history.  This is a 
feature that history shares with the theory of action to the degree that 
the penultimate referent of historical discourse is those interactions 
capable of engendering the social bond.  It is not surprising therefore 
that history unfolds the full range of modes of explanation likely to 
make human interaction intelligible.  On the one side, the series of 
repeatable facts of quantitative history lend themselves to a causal 
analysis and to the establishing of regularities that draw the idea of a 
cause, in the sense of efficacy, toward that of lawfulness, toward the 
model of the “if... then” relation. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  But see JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra, at 23.  Still, as Jonsen and Toulmin 
observe, from all these possible methods there are really two broad approaches to 
reasoning in practical fields such as law or ethics, stating: 
We inherit two distinct ways of discussing ethical issues:  One of these 
frames these issues in terms of principles, rules, and other general 
ideas; the other focuses on the specific features of particular kinds of 
moral cases.  In the first way general ethical rules relate to specific 
moral cases in a theoretical manner, with universal rules serving as 
‘axioms’ from which particular moral judgments are deduced as 
theorems.  In the second, this relation is frankly practical, with general 
moral rules serving as ‘maxims,’ which can be fully understood only in 
terms of the paradigmatic cases that define their meaning and force. 
Id. 
201 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 200, at 25.  Discussing the importance of geometry’s 
general principles, Jonsen and Toulmin state: 
The rigor of geometry was so appealing, indeed, that for many Greek 
philosophers formal deduction became the ideal of all rational 
argument. . . .   In due course, too (the hope was), other sciences would 
find their own unquestioned general principles to serve as their 
starting points, in explaining, for example, the natures of animals, 
plants, and the other permanent features of the world. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
202 Id. at 26-27.  Johnson and Toulmin explain: 
In theoretical fields such as geometry, statements or arguments were 
idealized, atemporal, and necessary: 
1.  They were “idealized” in the following sense.  Concrete physical 
objects, cut out of metal in the shapes of triangles or circles, can never 
be made with perfect precision. . . . The idealized “straight lines” and 
“circles” of geometry, by contrast, exemplify such truths with perfect 
exactness. 
2.  They were “atemporal” in the following sense.  Any geometrical 
theorem that is true at one time or on one occasion will be true at any 
time and on any occasion. . . . 
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talking about mathematical entities, but its usefulness diminishes outside 
that rarefied sphere.  Aristotle observed, “[n]ot all of our 
knowledge . . . is of this sort; nor do we have this theoretical kind of 
certainty in every field.”203 
c. Law Uses Practical Reasoning 
Although lawyers frame arguments as though they rest on 
theoretical reasons as a matter of style, they actually rely on practical 
reasoning.204  Theoretical reasoning is rhetorically preferred because of 
the potency associated with results that are logically necessary.  Insofar 
as an argument rests on unquestioned principles, it cannot be supplanted 
by positions that emanate from shakier foundations.  However, when 
these supposedly unassailable principles are interrogated, they are 
usually found to lack the underpinnings of geometric certainty.  Jonsen 
and Toulmin make the distinction in this way: 
In the realm of Practice, certitude no longer requires a 
prior grasp of definitions, general principles, and 
axioms, as in the realm of Theory.  Rather, it depends on 
accumulated experience of particular situations; and this 
practical experience gives one a kind of wisdom–
phronesis–different from the abstract grasp of any 
theoretical science–episteme. . . . The realm of the 
                                                                                                                                  
3.  Finally, theoretical arguments were “necessary” in a twofold sense.  
The arguments of Euclidean geometry depended for their validity both 
on the correctness of the initial axioms and definitions and on the inner 
consistency of the subsequent deductions.  Granted Euclid’s axioms, 
all of his later theorems were “necessary consequences” of those initial 
truths.  If any of the theorems were questioned, conversely, this 
implied either that their starting point was incorrect or else that the 
steps taken in passing to the theorems were formally fallacious. 
Id. 
203 Id. at 25 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS VI, iii-vii). 
204 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 200, at 31.  Jonsen and Toulmin state: 
[P]ractical fields such as law, medicine, and public administration deal 
with concrete actual cases, not with abstract idealized situations.  They 
are directly concerned with immediate facts about specific situations 
and individuals:  general ideas concern them only indirectly, as they 
bear on the problems of those particular individuals.  Unlike natural 
scientists, who are free to decide in advance which types of situations, 
cases, or individuals they may (or need not) pay attention to, 
physicians, lawyers, and social service workers face myriad 
professional problems the moment any client walks through the 
door. . . . [T]hey cannot choose to ignore them or their problems. 
Id. 
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practical included, for Aristotle, the entire realm of 
ethics:  in his eyes the subject matter of moral reflection 
lay within the sphere of practical wisdom rather than 
theoretical comprehension.205 
Rather than addressing ideal constructs which are based on truths 
always valid at all times and places, legal reasoning, like moral 
reflection, works with categories that are “concrete, temporal, and 
presumptive.”206  Practical reasoning underscores the importance of fact 
determinations because it is precisely the recounting of historical events 
which provides the concrete component of legal analysis. 
Ricoeur’s discussion of practical reasoning contains the central 
argument of this Article. For Ricoeur, practical reasoning serves as the 
vehicle for agreement among opposed parties.  To reach agreement, 
interlocutors adjust their descriptions of historical events until (1) there is 
an agreed upon recounting of the past and (2) each party perceives his or 
her respective position as honored and accepted.  Attorneys and judges 
arrive at agreement by adjusting factual descriptions as well.  This 
conclusion is illustrated by Ricoeur’s example of map-making. 
d. Practical Reasoning is Distorted When Narratives Change Descriptive 
Scale 
Ricoeur draws our attention to scales of reference used in 
cartography, optics, and architecture.207  The idea of scale is relatively 
                                                          
205 Id. at 26. 
206 Id. at 27. Toulmin and Jonsen make the distinction by comparing the sorts of 
discussion one can have about triangles with the sort of discussion one has about chickens: 
In all three respects, practical statements and arguments differed from 
theoretical ones by being concrete, temporal, and presumptive. 
1. They were “concrete” in the following sense.  Chickens are never 
idealized entities, and the things we say about cooking make no 
pretense to geometrical perfection. . . . 
2. They were “temporal” in this sense.  The same experience that 
teaches what is normally the case at any time also teaches what is the 
case only sometimes . . .  Truths of practical experience thus do not hold 
good “universally” or “at any time”:  rather, they hold “on occasion” or 
“at this or that moment” – that is, usually, often, at most always. 
3. Finally, practical arguments were “presumptive” in this sense.  
Chicken is normally good to eat, so a particular chicken just brought 
from the store is “presumably” good to eat.  In unusual cases that 
conclusion may be open to rebuttal . . . . 
Id. 
207 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 210-11.  Commenting on scale, Ricouer explains: 
The notion of scale is borrowed from cartography, architecture, and 
optics.  In cartography, there is an external referent, the territory that 
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straightforward.  To define the scale of a map is to identify the units of 
comparative measurement.  The distance graphically represented in a 
map corresponds in direct proportion with real distances in the 
geographical area shown.  The level of detail, i.e., what is shown on a 
map, is a function of the scale chosen.  When the scale on a map is 
altered, certain features appear and disappear.208  By selecting the scale 
used, the cartographer selects what is revealed and concealed. 
Because of external referents involved, changing the scale of a map 
depicting a geographic location is relatively unproblematic.  One can 
locate physical realities represented on the map.  Assume the situation 
where the map-reader is accustomed to a map employing the scale of 
one inch to a mile.  Assume further that this same map-reader must later 
rely on a map depicting the same area that uses a scale of one inch to five 
miles.  Even if familiar features are missing from the second map 
because of the difference in scale, the map-reader can still use the map 
with fewer streets or geographic references by focusing on the main 
thoroughfares depicted.  Once the reader locates a major landmark, the 
second map becomes helpful. 
By contrast, changing the scale of reference where there is no 
corresponding physical referent presents a more perplexing difficulty.  
Ricoeur considers questions of scale in the context of architecture and 
urban planning.209  The complexity arises from the lack of clear physical 
signposts to orient the observer’s understanding.  Ricoeur observes: 
[U]nlike the relationship between map and territory, the 
architect’s or urban planner’s plan has as its referent a 
building, a town, yet to be constructed.  What is more, 
the building or the town have varying relations with 
their contexts scaled in terms of nature, the landscape, 
                                                                                                                                  
the map represents.  What is more, the distances measured by maps of 
different scales are commensurable according to homothetic relations, 
which authorizes us to speak of the reduction of a terrain to a given 
scale.  However, from one scale to another we observe a change in the 
level of information as a function of the level of organization. 
Id. 
208 Id. at 210.  Ricoeur states, “[t]he key idea attached to the idea of a variation in scale is 
that, when we change scale, what becomes visible are not the same interconnections but 
rather connections that remained unperceived at the macrohistorical scale.”  Id. 
209 Id. at 211.  Ricoeur explains, “[t]he role of the idea of scale in architecture and in urban 
planning is also relevant to our discussion.  Proportional relations comparable to those in 
cartography are posited along with the balance between gain and loss of information 
depending on the scale chosen.”  Id. 
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communication networks, the already constructed parts 
of the town, and so on.210 
Because the proposed building needs to fit into already-existing 
frameworks of buildings, geography, and infra-structure, there are 
limitations on how expansive a planned structure can be.  Nevertheless, 
even within these limitations, it can be difficult to visualize the final 
product without careful attention to scale of the plans.  The ability to 
apprehend what a new town or subdivision will look like requires an act 
of imagination and projection.  Constant movement occurs between 
what is concretely present and known, and what is planned.211  It is by 
holding to this dialectic between the real and the intended that plans 
conform to spatial demands and are able to be given solid expression. 
Ricoeur describes the profession of the historian (and by analogy 
that of the judge) as in some sense architectural.212  Just as the architect 
has set coordinates and limitations into which she must fit her proposed 
design, so too historians have limitations with which they must contend 
while drafting history.  They are constrained by the facts in the archive, 
and their constructions of historical events cannot differ dramatically 
from previous work in the area without significant justification for such 
a deviation.213  Likewise, judges are similarly constrained by the 
traditions of which they are a part.  Their decisions need to fit into 
categories that will be sensible to other professionals working in the 
field.214  Like architects and historians, judges must survey the land and 
determine where and how a new structure will be integrated into the 
already-existing body of law.215 
                                                          
210 Id. 
211 GADAMER, supra note 130, at 291.  Gadamer explains: 
[T]he movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the 
part and back to the whole.  Our task is to expand the unity of the 
understood meaning centrifugally.  The harmony of all the details with 
the whole is the criterion of correct understanding.  The failure to 
achieve this harmony means that understanding has failed. 
Id. 
212 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 211. 
213 Id.  Ricoeur states, “[h]istorical discourse has to be built up in the form of a set of 
works.  Each work gets inserted into an already existing environment.  Rereadings of the 
past are in this way reconstructions, at the price sometimes of costly demolitions:  
construct, deconstruct, reconstruct are familiar gestures to the historian.”  Id. 
214 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-30 (1986) (Dworkin’s notion of “fit” 
from the idea of law as integrity in his model of the chain novel).  Id. 
215 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 320-21.  Ricoeur explains: 
[T]he fit that the judgment establishes between the presumed truth of 
the narrative sequence and the imputability by reason of which the 
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This analogy of law with architecture limps because verbal 
constructions lack the solidity of structures made of steel and stone.  
How buildings fit into a landscape has clearer boundaries and clearer 
criteria for comparing different projects than does defining limits of 
verbal formulae.  The slippage that occurs in transmitting thoughts from 
one person to another comes to the fore when trying to determine how a 
proposed fact description compares with other descriptions of the same 
facts found by the lower court (to say nothing of how a given description 
can be compared to fact patterns set forth in completely different 
cases).216  Ricoeur believes that the locus of this distortion is “the absence 
of commensurability of the dimensions.”217  More simply put, people use 
different words to describe the same thing or the same words to describe 
different things.  This lack of precision leads to confusion, because there 
is no external referent against which to compare the expressions 
employed.218  Ricoeur explains how the change in scale changes the 
explanation: 
In changing scale, one does not see the same things as 
larger or smaller. . . . One sees different things.  One can 
no longer speak of a reduction of scale.  There are 
different concatenations of configuration and causality.  
The balance between gains and losses of information 
applies to the modeling operations that bring into play 
different heuristic imaginary forms.  In this regard, what 
we can reproach in macrohistory is its failure to notice 
its dependence on a choice of scale with its macroscopic 
optical point of view that it borrowed from a more 
cartographical than historical model.219 
Just as historians are “subject to reproach” for failing to note how 
their verbal constructions are dependent on scale, so too are attorneys 
and judges.  As indicated by Dean Pound and Professor Goodhart, the 
very malleability of factual description permits legal decisions to rest on 
bases that none of the parties to a lawsuit would recognize as emerging 
                                                                                                                                  
accused is held accountable–this good fit in which explanation and 
interpretation come together at the moment the verdict is pronounced–
operates only within the limits traced out by the prior selection of the 
protagonists and of the acts alleged. 
Id. 
216 RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16. 
217 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 211. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 211-12. 
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out of their dispute.220  Because the change in scale alters which 
explanatory chains are visible or operative, any relatively adequate 
understanding of the stakes in a given case requires careful attention to 
the scale the court employs when viewing the evidence in the record.  
Failure to address problems of scale in an appellate brief may well result 
in a failure before the court.  Nevertheless, despite one’s best efforts, 
difficulty may occur because language lacks the solidity of bricks and 
mortar. 
Moving from the abstract to the concrete, the different versions of 
the crime story in Strickland and their implications for the ensuing 
representation stories highlight how the change in scale changes the 
reasoning.  By truncating facts presented in the lower courts in her 
version of the crime story, Justice O’Connor suggested there was nothing 
remarkable about Washington’s crimes or life history.  Thus, the chains 
of reasoning which indicated error to the lower courts where Tunkey 
failed to hire a psychologist or investigate the defendant’s background 
fell by the wayside.  This maneuver could not be accomplished if the 
scale of the facts, the density of description, held constant in both the 
Supreme Court and lower court opinions. 
3. The Narrative Phase 
The third stage in non-fiction writing is called the narrative phase, 
which designates composition, putting words on paper.  Here the author 
takes materials gathered in the documentary phase and weaves them 
together with “because” explanations developed in the explanatory 
phase.  As previously indicated, all descriptions of historical events, all 
understandings, are rooted in narratives explaining them.221  For this 
reason, it is difficult to separate key features of the narrative process 
from the other phases which are already bound and defined by 
narratives.  Authors such as Bruner, Amsterdam, Austin Sarat, and 
Thomas R. Kearns have explored some implications of narrative and 
law;222 their work is indebted in some measure to the masterful 
                                                          
220 See, e.g., supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (describing the opinions of Dean 
Pound and Professor Goodhart). 
221 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 239.  Ricoeur argues, “no one ignores the fact 
that before becoming an object of historical knowledge, the event is the object of some 
narrative.  In particular, the narratives left by contemporaries occupy a prime place among 
documentary sources.”  Id. 
222 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12; see also JEROME BRUNER, MAKING 
STORIES:  LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002) (resting upon the foundation developed in Bruner’s 
earlier works); JEROME BRUNER, supra note 186; JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE 
WORLDS (1986); THE RHETORIC OF LAW (A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns eds., 1994). 
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scholarship of the late Robert Cover, who wrote persuasively about law 
and narrative.223  Cover offers a concise introduction to the interaction 
between law and narrative, stating: 
We inhabit a nomos - a normative universe.  We 
constantly create and maintain a world  of right and 
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. . . . No 
set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from 
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.  For 
every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a 
scripture.  Once understood in the context of the 
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely 
a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which 
we live.224 
In a profound way, we are made up of the stories that shape and define 
our lives.  As Professor Cover indicates, these stories, these narratives, 
ground our laws and legal institutions. 
Despite some overlap, the explanatory and narrative phases are 
distinct steps in the operation of writing.225  The explanatory phase 
consists of “because” explanations to a chain of “why” questions taken 
from facts elicited in the documentary/archival phase.226  These 
“because” statements are linked by the judge attempting to understand if 
and why one series of events occurred rather than another.  By contrast, 
the narrative phase does not add any new causal linkages to answer 
                                                          
223 Robert Cover, Foreword:  Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1983). 
224 Id. at 4-5. 
225 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 238.  Drawing a distinction between the 
explanatory and narrative phases, Ricoeur states: 
On the one hand, it is taken for granted that narrativity does not 
constitute an alternative solution to explanation/understanding, 
despite what the adversaries and advocates of a thesis that, to be brief, 
I have proposed calling narrativist curiously agree on in saying.  On 
the other, it is affirmed that emplotment nevertheless constitutes a 
genuine component of the historiographical operation, but on another 
plane than the one concerned with explanation/understanding, where 
it does not enter into competition with uses of “because” in the causal 
or even the teleological sense. . . . [R]epresentation in its narrative 
aspect. . . does not add something coming from the outside to the 
documentary and explanatory phases, but rather accompanies and 
supports them. 
Id. 
226 Id. at 182. 
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these initial “why” questions.227  Rather, narrative provides a rhetorical 
structure that supports and accompanies this second phase.228 
Because historical events are recounted through the particular lens 
offered by witnesses, appellate legal narratives “normalize” actions and 
situations that otherwise appear quite strange.  For most people, what 
structures our identity and self image is less the result of “grand textures 
of cause and effect” and more those explanations occurring within “local 
frames of awareness,” what Clifford Geertz calls “local knowledge.”229  
These individual stories arise out of everyday experience and provide us 
with a site from which we can view and evaluate what goes on in the 
world outside us.230  Insofar as legal narratives consist largely of stories 
describing “local frames of awareness[,]” the reader cannot easily 
determine if the author is adjusting the scale of description in a given 
situation.  Thus, the author can select facts which make the extraordinary 
seem unimportant.  This normalization process emerges in a dialectic of 
highlighting and subordinating facts recounted. 
The narrative phase highlights or subordinates causal explanation 
through the device of plot.  As Ricoeur puts it: 
What is a plot? . . . [A] story[] describes a sequence of 
actions and experiences of a certain number of 
characters, whether real or imaginary.  These characters 
are represented in situations which change or to the 
changes of which they react.  These changes, in turn, 
                                                          
227 Id. at 238. 
228 Id. 
229 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:  FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 6 (1983). 
230 See, e.g., RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 278.  Describing narrative, 
Ricoeur states: 
[I]t must be said that any narrative combines, in varying proportions, 
two dimensions:  a chronological dimension and a non-chronological 
dimension.  The first may be called the ‘episodic dimension’ of the 
narrative.  Within the art of following a story, this dimension is 
expressed in the expectation of contingencies which affect the story’s 
development; hence it gives rise to questions such as:  and so? and 
then?  what happened next? . . . But the activity of narrating does not 
consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also constructs 
meaningful totalities out of scattered events.  This aspect of the art of 
narrating is reflected, on the side of following a story, in the attempt to 
‘grasp together’ successive events.  The art of narrating, as well as the 
corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are 
able to extract a configuration from a succession. 
Id. (italics in original). 
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reveal hidden aspects of the situation and the characters, 
giving rise to a new predicament which calls for thought 
or action or both.  The response to this predicament 
brings the story to its conclusion.231 
The narrative phase works with the facts selected and explanations 
forged in previous phases by framing them to underscore some 
arguments and to obscure others.232  For example, in Strickland, Justice 
O’Connor emphasizes the uncooperative client rather than focusing on 
the attorney who did little.  The representation story paints the defense 
attorney as the victim of circumstances caused by his client.  In contrast, 
the lower court decisions develop the crime story suggesting a disturbed 
defendant whose attorney abrogated his responsibility.  By emphasizing 
certain facts, the Strickland majority developed a plotline in which 
Tunkey’s actions were vindicated because he had no other practicable 
choices. 
This role reversal depicted in the competing storylines of the 
Strickland opinions emphasizes how fundamental the selection of 
characters and events is in telling a story.  These two aspects of narrative 
define a story and move it along.  They are linked because they have a 
similar point of emergence, i.e., they each stand in contrast to what 
counts as background or the status quo.233  The explanatory phase selects 
problematic facts and chooses to explain why they are problems.  To 
identify a matter as problematic, the explanation rests on a series of 
assumptions about when the story begins and what counts as 
“normal.”234  At the level of structure, historical change occurs when 
what was once seen as normal, unimportant, mere background, is 
suddenly seen as upsetting expectations, as a discordant note.235  When 
                                                          
231 Id. at 277. 
232 See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 
372 (2d Ed. 2002).  The concept of framing is largely self-explanatory.  Id.  Lakoff argues 
that it refers to the point of view in which a position or argument is couched, stating: 
Alternative framing possibilities also provide for forms of everyday 
variation in meaning. . . . Suppose you have a friend named Harry who 
doesn’t like to spend much money.  You could conceptualize him and 
describe him in two different ways.  You could say either “He’s 
thrifty” or “He’s stingy.”  Both sentences indicate that he doesn’t 
spend much money, but the first frames the issue in terms of resource 
preservation (thrift), while the second frames the issue in terms of 
generosity (stinginess). 
Id. 
233 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 44. 
234 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 243-44. 
235 Id. at 243. 
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an occurrence that was once seen as trivial becomes an integral part of 
the plot, that episode is called an event.236 
Who counts as an actor in drafting a narrative is no less important 
than what counts as an event.237   This observation highlights the notion 
of who is portrayed as having choices and the opportunity to act on 
them.  Mere stock characters who act in wholly predictable ways are 
essentially freed from responsibility vis-à-vis anything important that 
occurs in the narrative.  Their actions seem more on the level of stimulus 
response and, as such, blend into the background.  By contrast, if a 
character is capable of making choices, if the character has suffered or 
agonized over a decision, then this character can perform actions that 
move the plot forward.238 
Because the crime story and the representation story interlock in 
Strickland, the treatment of character and event in the crime story 
determines what appears normal or expected in the representation story.  
The extensive and detailed description of the defendant’s background 
and offenses in the lower courts contrast with Justice O’Connor’s brief 
rendering of these facts.  By underplaying the defendant’s brutal 
childhood and his blood-drenched crimes, the Court makes the 
defendant’s actions seem less horrifying and thus less indicative of 
mental disturbance; as a result, Tunkey’s failure to act seems less 
culpable.  Insofar as Washington’s background and crimes are rendered 
“normal,” part of a script, Tunkey’s lack of action seems an appropriate 
response, and is all that could reasonably be required when facing this 
ordinary case. 
4. Legal Lessons Learned from Ricoeur 
In summary, what emerges from Ricoeur’s three-part process are a 
number of themes to bear in mind when addressing the facts in appellate 
opinions.  First, the statement of facts in appellate opinions is a linguistic 
construction rather than an unerring representation of historical 
                                                          
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 244.  Ricouer describes narrative, stating: 
[I]nasmuch as the actors in a narrative–the characters–are emplotted 
along with the story, the notion of narrative identification, correlative 
to that of narrative coherence, too is open to noteworthy transpositions 
on the historical plane.  The notion of a character constitutes a 
narrative operator of the same amplitude as that of an event.  The 
characters perform and suffer from the action recounted. 
Id. 
238 Id. 
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events.239  Judges write different versions of the facts just as historians 
construct different and opposed narratives about the same events.240  It is 
difficult to describe precisely any historical event, and good judges are 
subject to the same limitations the best historians are. 
Second, the way the facts are rendered by a court becomes more 
important than “what actually happened,” just as the recounting of 
history in a written text suppresses and surpasses the historical event 
described.241  The reader has no access to the historical event; her only 
access is to the words that are written down.242  What constitutes a “fact” 
for the purposes of law is not the transitory and evanescent historical 
event itself, but rather the description of it reduced to words either by 
the witnesses on the record, attorneys in their briefs, or the judge in 
writing the appellate decision.243  Historical events are fleeting moments 
                                                          
239 Id. at 179.  In particular, Ricoeur states: 
What is one talking about when one says that something happened? 
. . .[I]t is to preserve this status of the reference of historical discourse 
that I distinguish the fact as “something said,” the “what” of historical 
discourse, from the event as “what one talks about,” the “subject 
of . . .” that makes up historical discourse.  In this regard, that assertion 
of a historical fact indicates the distance between the said (the thing 
said) and the intended reference, which according to one of 
Benveniste’s expressions turns discourse back toward the world.  The 
world, in history, is past human life as it happened. . . .   To get there, 
we need to leave underdetermined the question of the actual relation 
between fact and event, and tolerate a certain indiscrimination in the 
employment by the best historians of these terms as standing for each 
other. 
Id. 
240 Id. at 241-42.  Discussing the manner in which historians interpret facts, Ricouer 
argues: 
The problem is posed that will be the torment of any literary 
philosophy of history:  what difference separates history from fiction, 
if both narrate?  The classic answer that history alone retraces what 
actually happened does not seem to be contained in the idea that the 
narrative form has within itself a cognitive function.  This aporia, 
which we can call that of the truth of history, becomes apparent 
through the fact that historians frequently construct different and 
opposed narratives about the same events.  Should we say that some 
omit events and considerations that others focus on and vice versa?  
The aporia would be warded off if we could add rival versions to one 
another, allowing for submitting the proposed narratives to the 
appropriate corrections. 
Id. 
241 Id. at 241. 
242 Id. at 242. 
243 Id. at 178-79.  Ricoeur states: 
A vigilant epistemology will guard here against the illusion of 
believing that what we call a fact coincides with what really happened, 
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that occupy a definite set of space and time coordinates.  These events 
are observed by different people from various vantage points, and each 
witness has individual biases and virtues.  Naturally, testimony about a 
given event may diverge.  This starting point for all information to be 
transmitted illustrates the difficulty of determining how a given 
rendition of the facts corresponds with particular historical events.  Once 
a history is established, once a text is written down, it develops a life of 
its own.244  When an historical event is enshrined in written record, it 
endures.  The text itself shapes memory of what occurred; its very 
longevity will eventually “eclipse” the historical event.245 
Third, the text’s eclipsing of the historical event makes the drafting 
of facts particularly susceptible to authorial manipulation, such as the 
exercise of judicial discretion.  Ricoeur’s explanation indicates that there 
are many ways history or the statement of facts in a case can be 
constructed.246  As Barak observes, the choice among such narratives is 
                                                                                                                                  
or with the living memory of eyewitnesses, as if the facts lay sleeping 
in the documents until the historians extracted them.  This 
illusion . . . for a long time underlay the conviction that the historical 
fact does not differ fundamentally from the empirical fact in the 
experimental natural sciences. . . . [W]e need to resist this initial 
confusion between a historical fact and a really remembered event.  
The fact is not the event, itself given to the conscious life of a witness, 
but the contents of a statement meant to represent it. 
Id. 
244 RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 134 (“The surpassing of the event by the 
meaning is characteristic of discourse as such.”). 
245 Id. at 149.  Ricoeur argues: 
The eclipse of the circumstantial world by the quasi-world of texts can 
be so complete that, in a civilisation of writing, the world itself is no 
longer what can be shown in speaking but is reduced to a kind of 
‘aura’ which written works unfold.  Thus we speak of the Greek world 
or the Byzantine world.  This world can be called ‘imaginary’ in the 
sense that it is represented by writing in lieu of the world presented by 
speech; but this imaginary world is itself a creation of literature. 
Id. (italics in original). 
246 RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 339-40.  Ricouer discusses narrative, stating: 
Concerning the narrative, no one is unaware that one can always 
recount in another way, considering the selective nature of all 
emplotment; and one can play with different types of plot and other 
rhetorical strategies, just as one can choose to show rather than to 
recount.  All this is well known.  The uninterrupted series of 
rewritings, in particular on the level of narratives of great scope, testify 
to the untamable dynamics of the work of writing in which the genius 
of the writer and the talent of the artisan are expressed together.  
However, by identifying interpretation and representation without 
qualification, we deprive ourselves of the distinct instrument of 
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legal and therefore a proper locus for the exercise of judicial discretion.247  
Remington would see the construction of facts as a likely place for the 
exercise of discretion because it takes place largely out of the public eye, 
in the judge’s chambers; thus, this behavior is unlikely to be regulated 
and leaves the actor free to make choices he might not otherwise make.248  
Remington would also predict the exercise of discretion in drafting facts 
where the legislature and courts have prevented changing the law in 
post-AEDPA habeas challenges.  By restricting the ability to address 
possible qualms about existing law in these cases, it seems likely that 
discretion will not disappear but rather shift, not to a different actor in 
this case, but to a different function performed by the same actor, i.e., the 
drafting of the facts.249 
Before moving from theory to application, one must bear in mind 
that the choice of factual narratives is a moral one; courts act in ethically 
important ways when they describe events.  Cover addressed the 
consequences of applying what may seem an abstract legal framework 
by actors applying the law. 
“Law” is never just a mental or spiritual act.  A legal 
world is built only to the extent that there are 
commitments that place bodies on the line. . . . [T]he 
interpretive commitments of officials are realized, 
indeed, in the flesh.  As long as that is so, the 
interpretive commitments of a community which resists 
official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it 
be the flesh of its own adherents.250 
As Michel Foucault continually pointed out, discourses of knowledge 
create that which they describe.  Rather than presupposing “the 
enigmatic treasure of ‘things’” before discourse, Foucault reminds us 
that our speech and our stories have consequences in the real world.  The 
careful interpreter sees “the regular formation of objects that emerge 
only in discourse.”251  If our description of a phenomenon acts to create 
that phenomenon, as description must in a legal system rooted in 
                                                                                                                                  
analysis, interpretation already functioning at the other stages of 
historiographical activity. 
Id. 
247 BARAK, supra note 14, at 7, 8. 
248 Remington, supra note 105, at 75. 
249 Id. at 99. 
250 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986). 
251 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON 
LANGUAGE 47 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972). 
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precedent, then our act of describing is itself subject to moral constraints.  
How we describe the facts in a case affects not only the immediate 
litigants before the court but also those whose cases will be affected by 
the precedent set.  The consequences of a dishonest or careless 
description will be “realized in the flesh” of human beings.252 
V.  APPLICATION:  HOW CHANGING FACTS CHANGES THE LAW - STRICKLAND 
AND ITS UNEXPECTED PROGENY 
To clarify, I would like to resurrect the model of the post-AEDPA 
stainless steel fact-sorter to determine which facts would permit relief 
from a habeas court on the basis of the crime and representation 
narratives described by the Strickland majority.  An honest reading of the 
facts in Justice O’Connor’s opinion reveals that the following combined 
actions should not result in relief if the Strickland rule is unchanged:  (1) 
an attorney’s failure to investigate a defendant’s family history; (2) an 
attorney’s failure to talk with a defendant’s employers; (3) an attorney’s 
failure to consult a defendant’s neighbors; (4) an attorney’s failure to 
request psychological experts; and, (5) an attorney’s failure to request a 
presentence report.  Furthermore, if one considers facts in the record 
unmentioned by the Court:  (1) the attorney’s failure to read a 
competency report ordered in the instant case; and, (2) his failure to 
argue at sentencing for even five minutes on these three brutal cases, 
were not held to support an ineffective assistance claim. 
A. The Rule in Strickland 
Having dealt with the facts, let us now consider the rules or norms at 
work in these cases.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the 
right to an attorney.253  Not until the Supreme Court case of Strickland v. 
Washington did the Supreme Court flesh out important contours of this 
constitutional right.  Although earlier cases stated that such counsel 
must be “effective,” the Court’s pre-Strickland decisions considered only 
affirmative governmental interference with representation rather than 
                                                          
252 Cover, supra note 250, at 1605. 
253 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The text of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. 
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addressing the substance of the defense attorney’s actions or failures to 
act.254  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Strickland observed, “[t]he 
Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional 
requirement of effective assistance in . . .  those [cases] presenting claims 
of ‘actual ineffectiveness.’”255 
Justice O’Connor announced the Strickland rule as follows:  “The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced 
a just result.”256  The Court found that this standard also held for a 
capital sentencing hearing because this proceeding “is sufficiently like a 
trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for 
decision.”257  This decision has been commonly expressed as a two-part 
test.258  The first prong requires that the defendant must show that trial 
counsel’s performance was deficient.259  Second, the defendant must 
prove that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.260  The test 
for the deficient performance prong is whether counsel’s representation 
fell below “objective standard of reasonableness.”261  In applying this 
test, trial counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.”262  The performance prong should be 
analyzed in light of performance at the time of trial or capital sentencing; 
by contrast, the prejudice prong is analyzed under existing law at the 
time of the ineffectiveness challenge.263 
                                                          
254 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.  “Government violates the right to effective assistance when 
it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions 
about how to conduct the defense.”  Id.  See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) 
(bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 
U.S. 853  (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 
(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 
570, 593-96 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant).  But see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 344 (1980).  Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to 
effective assistance, simply by failing to render “adequate legal assistance.”  Id.  An actual 
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer’s performance renders assistance ineffective.  
Id. at 345-50. 
255 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 668, 686-87 (footnotes omitted). 
258 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 534; accord, Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). 
261 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
262 Id. at 690. 
263 Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369. 
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B. While Claiming Adherence to Strickland, Facts Change the Rule in Later 
Cases 
Initially, the Court expanded the class of relevant facts in the 
ineffective assistance case of Williams v. Taylor.264  The Williams Court 
held that Strickland’s deficient performance prong was met by the 
defendant when counsel “either failed to discover or failed to offer” 
evidence of mitigation in a capital sentencing proceeding.265  The Court, 
in reaching its decision, observed, inter alia, that counsel did not begin to 
prepare for the sentencing phase until a week before trial.266  Counsel 
failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive 
records of the defendant’s “nightmarish childhood[,]” including 
mistreatment, abuse, and neglect in early childhood, as well as testimony 
that he was “borderline mentally retarded,” had suffered numerous 
head injuries, and might have had “mental impairments organic in 
origin.”267  This failure to investigate was found not to be based on any 
strategic calculation, but caused by counsels’ incorrect belief that the 
state barred access to these records.268  Even Justice Rehnquist’s dissent 
“assume[d] without deciding that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”269 
That these facts are found relevant in Williams, based on a strict 
application of Strickland, is surprising.270  The Court underscores its 
commitment to the Strickland test, maintaining that neither the “clarity of 
the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as ‘established’ by 
this Court” is in any way minimized or “obviate[d]” by the decision.271  
Nevertheless, the facts cited by the Williams Court differ markedly from 
those considered relevant by the majority in Strickland.  In Williams, the 
failure to investigate becomes the lodestar of the decision while it was 
simply a peripheral matter in Strickland.  The extreme facts in Williams 
permit the Court to base its deviation from Strickland on the language of 
evaluating the facts on a case-by-case basis, but later cases demonstrate a 
continued willingness to broaden the scope of facts considered. 272 
                                                          
264 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
265 Id. at 393. 
266 Id. at 395. 
267 Id. at 370, 395-96. 
268 Id. at 395. 
269 Id. at 418 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
270 Id. at 391. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
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Although the Court in both Wiggins and Rompilla repeats the holding 
of Strickland as the governing law, and although the governing law in 
both was subject to the restrictions of AEDPA, the way the Court 
describes the facts in these cases raises the bar for attorney performance 
from the position mapped out by the Strickland majority.273  In Wiggins, 
the defendant argued that his attorneys’ failure to investigate his 
background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life 
history at his capital sentencing hearing violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.274  The defendant was found guilty of first degree 
murder, robbery, and two counts of theft.275  He elected to be sentenced 
by a jury because he faced the death penalty.276  Before sentencing, his 
attorneys filed a motion to bifurcate the sentencing hearing in hopes of 
presenting his defense in two phases.277  Phase one was to prove that 
Wiggins was not a “principal in the first degree,” i.e., he did not kill the 
victim with his own hand.278  If the jury failed to accept this approach, 
phase two of his defense would have been to present a mitigation case.279 
The trial court denied the bifurcation motion and immediately 
proceeded to the sentencing hearing.280  Despite the defense attorney’s 
promise to the jury that they would hear that Wiggins had had a difficult 
life, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life history.281  Before 
closing, Wiggins’ other attorney made a proffer to the trial court, outside 
                                                          
273 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 529 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citations omitted).  “We 
established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
Strickland v. Washington. . . .”  Id.  “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we made no new 
law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim . . . [and the Court noted] that the merits of 
Williams’ claim ‘are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland.’”  Id. at 522 (citations 
omitted.)  See also Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct 2456, 2462 (2005). 
Rompilla’s entitlement to federal habeas relief turns on showing that 
the state court’s resolution of his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. . . . Ineffective assistance under Strickland is deficient 
performance by counsel resulting in prejudice . . . with performance 
being measured against an objective standard of 
reasonableness . . under prevailing norms. 
Id. (citing  Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
274 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 514. 
275 Id. at 515. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
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of the jury’s presence, to preserve the bifurcation motion for appeal.282  In 
this offer of proof, he detailed the mitigation case counsel would have 
presented had court granted their bifurcation motion, including 
psychological records and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins’ 
limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state, the absence 
of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for sympathy, and his 
desire to function in the world.283  At no point was any of this evidence 
placed before the jury.284  The jury returned a verdict for the death 
penalty.285 
To support his post-conviction claim, Wiggins introduced testimony 
of a social worker describing an elaborate social history presentation, 
including evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse Wiggins had 
suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a number of 
foster homes.286  This report relied upon state social service records, 
medical and school records, as well as interviews with Wiggins and 
numerous family members.287  It revealed that Wiggins’ mother was an 
alcoholic who would leave her children alone for days without food, 
forcing them to beg, eat paint chips, or salvage food from garbage 
cans.288  She beat the children for breaking into the kitchen, which she 
kept locked, and had sex with men while her children slept in the same 
bed.289   On one occasion, she forced Wiggins’ hand against a hot stove 
burner which led to his hospitalization.290  At age six, Wiggins was 
placed in foster care where he was physically abused by his foster 
parents, and his second foster father repeatedly sexually molested him 
and raped him.291  At age sixteen, he ran away from foster care and lived 
on the streets; he returned to foster homes intermittently thereafter, 
including one where the gang of his foster mother’s son raped him on 
more than one occasion.292 
Despite failing to raise these matters in mitigation, counsel did a 
great deal of work in this case; however, representation was found to be 
                                                          
282 Id. at 515-16. 
283 Id. at 516. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 516-17. 
287 Id. at 516. 
288 Id. at 516-17. 
289 Id. at 517. 
290 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
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ineffective.  Counsel represented Wiggins during a four-day trial before 
the court.293  Counsel knew of Wiggins’ unfortunate childhood because 
they had available to them the written presentence investigation report 
prepared by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation.294  
Additionally, counsel “tracked down” records kept by the Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services “documenting petitioner’s various 
placements in the State’s foster care system.”295  Counsel also arranged 
for a psychologist to conduct a number of tests on Wiggins, including an 
IQ test, and, presumably, the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, but 
“[t]hese reports revealed nothing, however, of [Wiggins’] life history.”296  
Although these facts do not of themselves prove that the defendant’s 
representation was effective, it does appear that Wiggins’ counsel did far 
more than did Strickland’s.  Indeed, in comparison to Tunkey’s lack of 
investigation, Wiggins’ counsel seem diligent; thus, it is ironic that their 
representation is found ineffective based on the standard set in 
Strickland. 
Similar results emerge in Rompilla v. Beard.  Rompilla was found 
guilty of murder and related offenses; the jury found three aggravating 
factors that weighed in favor of assigning the death penalty.297  
Rompilla’s evidence in mitigation presented at sentencing included 
testimony from five family members who argued in favor of “residual 
doubt, and beseeched the jury for mercy, saying that they believed 
Rompilla was innocent and a good man.”298  Despite the two mitigating 
factors that rehabilitation was possible and that his “son had testified on 
his behalf,” the jury gave greater weight to the aggravating factors and 
sentenced Rompilla to death.299 
The district court in a later habeas proceeding found that the state 
court had erroneously applied Strickland to counsel’s performance in the 
                                                          
293 Id. at 515. 
294 Id. at 523. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. 
297 Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2460.  Specifically, the Court reasoned: 
[D]uring the ensuing penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to prove 
three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence:  that the murder 
was committed in the course of another felony; that the murder was 
committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant history of 
felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence. . . . The 
Commonwealth presented evidence on all three aggravators, and the 
jury found all proven. 
Id. 
298 Id. at 2460. 
299 Id. at 2461. 
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penalty phase, finding that counsel had ignored “‘pretty obvious signs’ 
that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and suffered from mental illness 
and alcoholism, and instead had relied unjustifiably on Rompilla’s own 
description of an unexceptional background.”300  The circuit court 
overturned the district court’s finding, pointing out counsel’s efforts to 
discover evidence in mitigation, including: 
interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as 
well as consultation with three mental health experts.  
Although the majority noted that the lawyers did not 
unearth the “useful information” to be found in 
Rompilla’s “school, medical, police, and prison records,” 
it thought the lawyers were justified in failing to hunt 
through these records when their other efforts gave no 
reason to believe the search would yield anything 
helpful.301 
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit opinion on the 
grounds that counsel’s representation failed to meet the standards set 
forth in Strickland.302  The decision rests on a detailed fact description of 
errors by trial counsel.  Rather than focusing merely on what counsel did 
or did not do, Justice Souter’s opinion stresses “a number of likely 
avenues the trial lawyers could fruitfully have followed in building a 
mitigation case.”303  Further, counsel should have considered 
implications from known facts, such as extrapolating the defendant’s 
long-standing drinking problem from the note in the police reports 
indicating that he had been drinking at the time of the instant offense.304  
The Court found dispositive that counsel failed to examine the court file 
                                                          
300 Id. (citation omitted). 
301 Id. (citation omitted).  Indeed, the Circuit court noted specifically that Rompilla did far 
more than did Wiggins’ counsel.  Id.  Justice Souter observed: 
The panel thus distinguished Rompilla’s case from Wiggins v. 
Smith . . . Whereas Wiggins’s counsel failed to investigate adequately, 
to the point even of ignoring the leads their limited enquiry yielded, 
the Court of Appeals saw the Rompilla investigation as going far 
enough to leave counsel with reason for thinking further efforts would 
not be a wise use of the limited resources they had. But Judge 
Sloviter’s dissent stressed that trial counsel’s failure to obtain relevant 
records on Rompilla’s background was owing to the lawyers’ 
unreasonable reliance on family members and medical experts to tell 
them what records might be useful. 
Id. 
302 Id. at 2467-69. 
303 Id. at 2463. 
304 Id. 
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on Rompilla’s prior conviction, knowing that the prosecution would rely 
on it in part to make its aggravation case.305  This duty stands in stark 
contrast to Tunkey’s admission that he was not sure he looked at the 
psychologist’s report filed in the case before Strickland was sentenced.306  
Similarly, Tunkey apparently did no investigation save talking with the 
defendant.307 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The first conclusion to emerge from the foregoing analysis is that 
facts change the law.  The Strickland line of cases underscores that, even 
though the verbal formula used to describe the applicable rule does not 
change, the legal standard changes.  Evidence of this change is that the 
scope of facts considered as relevant expands greatly in the later cases.  
Indeed, matters once deemed by the Court as unimportant and 
irrelevant are now the basis for finding that counsel’s representation 
failed to meet constitutional requirements of effectiveness.  Ricoeur’s 
framework explains that judges exercise discretion in these cases by 
changing the level of abstraction or scale used to describe the historical 
events underlying the habeas proceeding.  As judges progressively 
increase the density of their descriptions, counsel is effectively held to a 
standard more rigorous than would be required by a fair reading of the 
original Strickland decision.  The way the judges describe the relevant 
facts has changed the law. 
A more tentative conclusion also suggests itself.  Insofar as Ricoeur 
unsettles a too-easy reliance on the correspondence between historical 
events and the facts as found in appellate decisions, his analysis likewise 
unsettles assumptions made in legal scholarship that the drafting of facts 
need not be interrogated so robustly as other components of case 
holdings.  Ricoeur’s work argues that the forging of legal categories may 
be as much a matter of scaling and adjusting the density of facts as it is of 
expanding or contracting proposed legal norms.  If this assertion is true, 
then scholars have here a tool for examining precedent whose reasoning 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by recourse to the development of 
norm-driven categories. Facts in appellate opinions are rarely pure and 
never simple.  The legal academy needs to look more closely at the 
exercise of judicial discretion that characterizes any recounting of 
historical events in court opinions.  In so doing, we may profitably 
                                                          
305 Id. at 2463-64. 
306 Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1982). 
307 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984). 
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recognize that it is a fictional Detective Joe Friday who insists on one’s 
ability to state “just the facts.” 
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